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COOPERATIVE JUSTICE:  UNDERSTANDING THE 
FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT THROUGH ITS INVOLVEMENT IN LIBYA 
Brendan Leanos*
 
 
In February 2011, the Libyan government began systematically and 
ruthlessly attacking its own citizens in an attempt to put down a political 
uprising.  These attacks escalated into a full-fledged armed conflict between 
the government and rebel militias that engulfed the country for several 
months.  With the old regime finally overthrown, and a new transitional 
government now in place, Libya looks to mend itself and to undo decades of 
oppression. 
Although the conflict is officially over, the world’s attention remains on 
Libya as the new government searches for ways to address the significant 
challenges left behind by the revolution.  One such challenge is bringing 
members of the old regime to justice for crimes they committed both before 
and during the revolution.  As a start to this process, the government has 
detained Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, Muammar Gaddafi’s son and former de 
facto prime minister, with the hope of trying him for crimes against 
humanity.  But because Libya shares jurisdiction over Saif with the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), it is unclear what that trial will look 
like or who will conduct it.  This Comment seeks to help clarify how justice 
should be pursued in light of the ICC’s governing principles and Libya’s 
present circumstances. 
This Comment first describes the evolution of international criminal 
justice over the past century, which culminated in the creation of the ICC.  
It then explores the ICC’s fundamental principles and goals, and offers 
different ways to conceptualize them.  Finally, this Comment observes some 
of the domestic issues that Libya faces and concludes that, given those 
issues, the ICC should work cooperatively with Libya to try Saif in his home 
country. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In February 2011, the people of Libya rose up against their government.1  
That government, led by Muammar Gaddafi (Gaddafi),2 responded with 
anger, violence, and mass murder.3  For the months that followed, armed 
conflict pervaded Libya and threw the country into chaos.4  Ultimately, on 
August 23, 2011, rebel fighters gained control of the capital city, Tripoli,5 
and with it, the nation.6  After capturing and killing their former ruler a few 
months later,7 Libyans finally came face to face with the opportunity they 
so desired—an opportunity to turn the page on their oppressed past and to 
begin a new chapter as a free and democratic society.8
But Libya still must reckon with its past.  Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Saif) 
and Abdulla Al-Senussi (Al-Senussi), two prominent members of Gaddafi’s 
regime,
 
9
 
 1. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2012:  EVENTS OF 2011, at 595 (2012).  
The uprising began with peaceful protests in Benghazi, Libya’s second-largest city, and 
quickly spread west to other large cities throughout the country. Id. 
 face charges before the International Criminal Court (ICC or 
Court) for crimes against humanity for their role in the government’s 
 2. Gaddafi’s name can be spelled in multiple ways.  For instance, “Gadhafi,” 
“Qaddafi,” and “Qadhafi” are all acceptable variations on the spelling.  This Comment 
follows the ICC’s spelling. 
 3. See Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11, Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif 
Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, ¶ 20 (June 27, 2011), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1101337.pdf (“[I]t appears from the Materials that people who 
opposed [Gaddafi’s] regime [during the uprising] . . . as well as members of their families, 
were arrested, tortured and in some instances even disappeared.”); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
supra note 1, at 595 (observing the government’s use of live fire on peaceful protestors as 
well as the “disappearance of hundreds of people suspected of involvement in anti-
government demonstrations”). 
 4. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 596–600 (describing the government 
attacking civilians with mortars and rockets, laying “perhaps tens of thousands” of land 
mines, and detaining thousands of people—both revolutionary fighters and civilians—in 
undisclosed locations to be tortured, raped, and/or killed). 
 5. Libya — Revolution and Aftermath, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/
international/countriesandterritories/libya/index.html (last updated Mar. 7, 2012). 
 6. Cf. Karin Laub & Ben Hubbard, Libya Rebels Overtake Tripoli as Gaddafi Regime 
Crumbles, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 22, 2011, 2:12 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/22/libya-rebels-tripoli_n_932706.html (describing 
the fall of Tripoli as marking the crumbling of Gaddafi’s regime and quoting President 
Obama, who declared:  “The future of Libya is now in the hands of the Libyan people.”). 
 7. Gaddafi was captured and killed on October 20, 2011. Libya — Revolution and 
Aftermath, supra note 5.  Indications are that rebel fighters executed him after capturing him, 
and his death is now being investigated. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 599. 
 8. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 601 (describing the opportunity 
Libyans have to rebuild their country). 
 9. The ICC notes that even though Saif, who is the late Gaddafi’s son, appeared to lack 
any official position in the regime, he was essentially “Gaddafi’s unspoken successor and the 
most influential person within his inner circle,” operating as the “de facto Prime Minister.” 
Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application 
Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar Mohammed Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and 
Abdullah Al-Senussi, ¶ 72 (June 27, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/
doc1101337.pdf.  Al-Senussi was Gaddafi’s national head of Military Intelligence. Id. ¶ 84. 
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reaction to the 2011 revolts.10  In addition, they face the prospect of justice 
at home, in Libyan courts.11
This Comment also raises several issues that apply more generally to all 
of the ICC’s cases moving forward.  These issues get to the heart of what 
the ICC’s central goals are, how it operates to achieve those goals, and, 
ultimately, its proper place within the international criminal justice 
community. 
  The question of where and how to try these 
two men for their international crimes—a question that is complicated by 
the current circumstances in Libya and by the dynamics of the international 
criminal justice community—is what this Comment seeks to answer. 
The creation of the ICC marked a momentous occasion for the 
international community—one that promised to redefine international 
criminal justice, and bring stability to an area of law that has long been 
unstable.12  However, the Court—almost ten years old13
Part I of this Comment provides background on the ICC, including its 
structure, governing principles, and history, as well as its place in the 
evolution of international criminal justice.  Part II analyzes the two most 
salient features of the ICC—the principle of complementarity and the 
ultimate goal of ending impunity for the world’s most serious crimes—and 
presents arguments for putting those features into practice.  Part III then 
describes the current political and legal landscape in Libya and introduces 
the challenge of determining where to prosecute captured members of 
Gaddafi’s regime.  Part IV proposes a comprehensive solution to the 
—faces a host of 
challenges in making those goals a reality.  Most notably, the ICC, a static, 
centralized institution, exists in a world and operates in a discipline that is 
dynamic and extremely nuanced.  The Court’s ability to succeed and carry 
out its mandate therefore depends on its ability to use its founding 
principles to adapt to the various situations and cases it confronts.  As this 
Comment argues, some of that adaptation will require the ICC to 
conceptualize those principles more broadly than the way in which the 
Court’s founding statute ostensibly presents them.  The current situation in 
Libya provides an opportunity to explore what this process might look like, 
and how the Court should think about its mandate moving forward. 
 
 10. See id. ¶¶ 41–42 (listing the charges against Saif and Al-Senussi for crimes against 
humanity).  The ICC’s involvement in these cases, and in the Libyan situation more 
generally, began when the U.N. Security Council issued Resolution 1970 and referred the 
situation to the Court. See S.C. Res. 1970, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011); see 
also INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, FIRST REPORT OF THE PROSECUTOR 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL PURSUANT TO 
UNSCR 1970 (2011), ¶¶ 1, 22 (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/
A077E5F8-29B6-4A78-9EAB-A179A105738E/0/UNSCLibyaReportEng04052011.pdf 
(discussing the Security Council referral and acknowledging the decision to initiate an 
investigation in Libya). 
 11. See Prosecution’s Submissions on the Prosecutor’s Recent Trip to Libya ¶¶ 1–14, 
Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11 (Nov. 25, 2011) [hereinafter Prosecution’s 
Submissions], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1276955.pdf (describing 
procedures the Libyan government has taken to bring Saif to justice). 
 12. See infra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra note 91 and accompanying text. 
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problem that the ICC faces in Libya, concluding that Libya and the ICC 
should work together to prosecute Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi in Libya.  While 
this solution is narrowly addressed to the Libya situation, it also provides a 
more general context in which the ICC should consider its work. 
I.  THE ROAD TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
While the ICC is less than a decade old, the wheels leading to its creation 
have been in motion for the better part of the past century.  Part I of this 
Comment chronicles the path the international community has taken to the 
ICC by first describing the institutions that preceded, and formed the 
jurisprudential basis for, the ICC.  It then introduces the ICC and its salient 
features. 
A.  Historical Development of International Criminal Justice 
Over the past century, “millions of human beings [have] perished as a 
result of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious 
crimes under international law.”14  The global community’s attempt to 
prosecute crimes under international law15 is known generally as 
international criminal justice.16  Historically, the international criminal 
justice community has been largely unsuccessful in keeping up with these 
crimes and the human rights abuses that accompany them.17
 
 14. PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON 
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 23 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2001) [hereinafter PRINCETON 
PRINCIPLES].  The International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences, in a 
comprehensive project designed to assist international organizations and governments in 
developing “an integrated approach to post-conflict justice,” found that between 92 and 101 
million people have been killed as a result of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
slavery, slave-related practices, and torture since 1945. 1 THE PURSUIT OF INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  A WORLD STUDY ON CONFLICTS, VICTIMIZATION, AND POST-CONFLICT 
JUSTICE, at xiii, 3 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2010) [hereinafter PURSUIT OF INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE]. 
  Nevertheless, 
 15. International law is defined as “[t]he legal system governing the relationships 
between nations; more modernly, the law of international relations, embracing not only 
nations but also such participants as international organizations and individuals (such as 
those who invoke their human rights or commit war crimes).” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
892 (9th ed. 2009).  For a detailed discussion of how international law developed, see 
generally Dapo Akande, Sources of International Criminal Law, in THE OXFORD 
COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 41, 41–53 (Antonio Cassese ed., 2009).  
Substantively, there is a direct relationship between international crimes and international 
human rights, in that international crimes are often considered “gross offences against 
universal values.” Antonio Cassese, The Rationale for International Criminal Justice, in THE 
OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra, at 123, 127. 
 16. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Criminal Justice in Historical Perspective:  The 
Tension Between States’ Interests and the Pursuit of International Justice, in THE OXFORD 
COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 131, 131 (defining 
international criminal justice as “the application of the principle of accountability for certain 
international crimes, whether before an international or national judicial body”).  Bassiouni 
also states that the general “goals of international criminal justice are to:  contribute to peace 
and reconciliation, provide a remedy to victims and eventually some closure, and to generate 
prevention through deterrence.” Id. at 140. 
 17. See Statements of the Presidents of the ICJ and of the International Criminal 
Tribunals, in 1 PURSUIT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 133, 134 
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the work of that community, in creating visibility for international criminal 
justice and giving life to a new kind of global jurisprudence, paved the way 
for the ICC and the current criminal justice landscape.  This section 
describes that landscape and outlines the institutions and basic ideas that led 
to its creation. 
1.  International Criminal Tribunals 
The birth of the modern international criminal justice community began 
with the creation of international criminal tribunals.18  In general, these 
tribunals are ad hoc institutions that arise from, and react to, conflicts where 
serious international crimes and human rights abuses are alleged to have 
occurred.19  Ordinarily, these tribunals are temporary, are created by 
international law statute or treaty, and exist to adjudicate a specific set of 
crimes arising out of a specific conflict over a specific period of time.20  
They also tend to use exclusively international judges and international law 
in their proceedings.21  And while their international features cause the 
nation from which the conflict arose to lose some of its legal sovereignty, 
the international community has welcomed international criminal tribunals 
in exceptional circumstances.22
In those circumstances, international criminal tribunals are thought to be 
preferable for a number of reasons.  First, when conflicts are severe and 
atrocities are committed, public resentment may be so strong in the conflict 
state that a fair trial and certain due process rights would be unavailable to 
the defendant.
 
23  Thus, the impartiality of an international judge in an 
international proceeding is sometimes necessary to protect these interests.24
 
(observing that until recently, “effective impunity reigned for those who committed 
genocide, crimes against humanity and serious war crimes”); Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/
general/overview.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2012) (“Most perpetrators of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity throughout history have gone unpunished. . . . [T]he same holds 
true for the twentieth century.”).  José Ayala Lasso, former U.N. High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, once observed, “[a] person stands a better chance of being tried and judged 
for killing one human being than for killing 100,000.” Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, supra. 
  
Second, international criminal tribunals are likely to create more 
international visibility than purely domestic proceedings, and a greater 
amount of visibility is thought to help deter future violations and 
 18. Cf. Cassese, supra note 15, at 123 (stating that international criminal justice in the 
modern world is characterized by an increased use of international courts and tribunals). 
 19. See Florian Jessberger, International v. National Prosecution of International 
Crimes, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 
208, 209; see also Akande, supra note 15, at 41 (noting the jurisdictional restrictions of three 
prominent international criminal tribunals). 
 20. See Jessberger, supra note 19, at 209. 
 21. See Cassese, supra note 15, at 127. 
 22. See Nadia Bernaz & Rémy Prouvèze, International and Domestic Prosecutions, in 1 
PURSUIT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 269, 270. 
 23. See Cassese, supra note 15, at 127. 
 24. See id. 
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conflicts.25  Third, international crimes “infringe values that are 
transnational and of concern for the whole world community.”26  Thus, 
when such crimes are committed, the international community is thought to 
be the proper community to “pronounce on [them],” and this 
pronouncement can only truly occur through an international trial.27
Examples of international criminal tribunals in history begin with the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg (IMTN).
 
28  A product of a 
multilateral treaty known as the London Agreement, the tribunal was 
created at the end of World War II and exercised jurisdiction over “‘persons 
who, acting in the interests of the European Axis countries, whether as 
individuals or as members of organizations, committed’ crimes against 
peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity.”29  It succeeded in 
prosecuting prominent Nazi officials thanks in part to its novel prohibition 
on pleading an official position as a defense to criminal liability,30 as well 
as the defense that crimes were committed as a result of following a 
superior’s orders.31  Due to its “recognition that some crimes [can] be so 
massive, so egregious, and so abhorrent to all decent people that they could 
be truly described as crimes . . . against all of humanity,”32 and its 
commitment to successfully shedding light on those crimes, the IMTN is 
considered a watershed event for the international criminal justice 
community.33
However, after the conclusion of the IMTN and its cousin tribunal in the 
Pacific, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East,
 
34 international 
criminal justice did not take another significant step forward until the early 
1990s,35 when the U.N. Security Council established two new ad hoc 
tribunals.  The first, created in 1992, was the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which was created to address 
the “ethnic cleansing” that had occurred there beginning in 1991.36
 
 25. See id. (noting that international criminal tribunals will create greater visibility and 
thus “better contribute to international efforts against impunity”). 
  Shortly 
thereafter, the Security Council set up the International Criminal Tribunal 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 128. 
 29. Bernaz & Prouvèze, supra note 22, at 272 (quoting Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279). 
 30. Before the IMTN, international law generally dealt only with conduct at the state 
level, while “[the individuals] who [led] the conduct were protected from culpability under 
the doctrine of state sovereignty.” Id. at 274.  In terms of developing the system of 
international law we have today and enabling that system to prosecute heads of state for 
gross human rights offenses, see id. at 273 & n.12, this aspect of the IMTN was 
“groundbreaking,” id. at 274. 
 31. See id. at 273. 
 32. Richard Goldstone, Lecture, International Human Rights at Century’s End, 15 
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 241, 244 (1999). 
 33. See Bernaz & Prouvèze, supra note 22, at 274. 
 34. See id. at 277–78. 
 35. See infra notes 72–75 and accompanying text (noting that the idea for an 
international criminal court was first proposed in 1948 but not acted upon for over forty 
years). 
 36. Bernaz & Prouvèze, supra note 22, at 283–84. 
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for Rwanda (ICTR) to prosecute those responsible for the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide.37  Both tribunals still exist today.38
The ICTY and the ICTR were significant to the development of 
international criminal justice for a number of reasons.  First, their very 
creation reflected a firm and coordinated commitment within the 
international community to punish gross violators of international criminal 
law.
 
39  Second, the case law and jurisprudence from these tribunals has 
helped develop, consolidate, and give shape to international criminal law.40  
Third, and perhaps most important, the success41 of these institutions has 
proven that international criminal justice is more than just a dream, and that 
purposeful international courts can have a real impact.42
2.  Hybrid Tribunals 
 
A more recent development in international criminal justice is 
internationalized, or “hybrid,” tribunals.  Like international criminal 
tribunals, these are ad hoc institutions established to address past violations 
of international criminal law.43
The primary difference between the two types of institutions is that 
hybrid tribunals have both international and domestic elements.
 
44  For 
instance, hybrid tribunals frequently use local judges or institutions in their 
proceedings.45  Precisely because they have national components, these 
tribunals are “often regarded as giving more deference to state sovereignty 
than [international criminal] tribunals.”46  This increased deference is 
preferable in some circumstances because it allows the conflict state to 
involve itself in the conflict resolution process, thus giving that state a voice 
in the healing process while also helping it build up its domestic judicial 
system.47  Some examples of hybrid tribunals are the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (established in 2002),48
 
 37. Id. at 289.  For four months in 1994, extremist members of the Hutu ethnic group 
systematically killed between 500,000 and 1 million Tutsi civilians, another ethnic group, 
and moderate Hutus. Id. 
 the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
 38. See Jesse Melman, Note, The Possibility of Transfer(?):  A Comprehensive 
Approach to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s Rule 11bis to Permit 
Transfer to Rwandan Domestic Courts, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1271, 1287 (2010) (explaining 
that the Security Council has extended the mandates of both tribunals until 2013). 
 39. See Jessberger, supra note 19, at 210. 
 40. See id. 
 41. As of 2009, the ICTY had indicted 161 persons and convicted 48 (with 5 acquittals), 
and the ICTR has indicted 94 persons and convicted 28 (also with 5 acquittals). Id. at 209. 
 42. See id. at 209–10. 
 43. Bernaz & Prouvèze, supra note 22, at 293–94. 
 44. Id. at 294. 
 45. See Cassese, supra note 15, at 129. 
 46. Bernaz & Prouvèze, supra note 22, at 294. 
 47. Id. (noting that hybrid tribunals include states more in the post-conflict process, 
which leads them to be preferable to international tribunals in situations that require 
sensitivity to local issues). 
 48. Id. at 302–07. 
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Court of Cambodia (2005),49 the War Crimes Chamber in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (2005),50 and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (2007).51
3.  Domestic Courts 
 
International criminals need not be tried in international institutions; 
national court systems may, and frequently have, assumed this 
responsibility.52  From a legal standpoint, national domestic courts exercise 
jurisdiction over international crimes in a couple of ways, depending on the 
“constitutional position of international law within the law of that state.”53  
Some states allow national courts to try international crimes directly, 
without requiring that the international law be implemented into the 
domestic legal regime.54  In those states, courts exercise jurisdiction over an 
international crime simply by virtue of the fact that the crime is punishable 
in international law.55
More commonly, however, domestic courts may apply international law 
only if the state’s legislation has incorporated the law.
 
56  Practically 
speaking, this requirement does not usually impede a domestic court’s 
ability to try international crimes, because international treaties often 
require national legislatures to include certain international crimes in 
domestic law.57  And to the extent that domestic legislation does not 
directly implement international law, and thus does not feature the same 
definitions or language, domestic legislation often includes analogous laws 
that are based on international law principles.58
In addition to requiring a legal basis upon which to try an international 
crime, state domestic courts also need jurisdiction over the perpetrator.  
Jurisdiction can arise in a number of ways.  First, “[u]nder . . . one of the 
most basic aspects of state sovereignty, states have jurisdiction over crimes 
committed in their territory.”
 
59  This notion is known as the territorial 
principle of jurisdiction, and applies regardless of the perpetrator’s 
citizenship.60
 
 49. Id. at 307–12. 
  Second, in what is known as the nationality principle, a “state 
 50. Id. at 312–15. 
 51. Id. at 316–22. 
 52. See Jessberger, supra note 19, at 208 (“History . . . shows notable domestic efforts to 
address international crimes by means of criminal law.”). 
 53. Akande, supra note 15, at 41. 
 54. Id. at 41–42.  Akande notes that this scenario is typical in many common law 
countries, such as the United States and United Kingdom. Id. at 42 (providing examples 
where courts in these states “have recognized that international law may create crimes 
subject to domestic prosecution without the need for domestic legislation”). 
 55. See id. at 42–43. 
 56. See id. at 41–42. 
 57. See id. at 42 (“For example, domestic legislation criminalizing genocide, war crimes, 
and torture [is] enacted in order to implement the state’s obligations under the Genocide 
Convention [of] 1948, the GCs of 1949 or the 1984 Torture Convention.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
 58. See id. 
 59. Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarity:  Reconciling the Jurisdiction of 
National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 383, 391 (1998). 
 60. See id. 
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has jurisdiction to prosecute its own nationals for crimes even when 
committed outside of its own territory.”61  Both the territorial and 
nationality principles are ordinary and relatively undisputed jurisdictional 
premises.62
Two other concepts may also give state domestic courts jurisdiction over 
international crimes:  the passive personality principle, under which “states 
may claim jurisdiction over crimes committed against their nationals 
wherever they may occur,”
 
63 and “the protective principle, which grants 
states jurisdiction over aliens for acts committed abroad but that present a 
threat to the security of the state.”64
Under a concept known as universal jurisdiction, states are also entitled 
to bring domestic proceedings against the perpetrator of certain crimes 
based solely on the nature of the crime.
 
65  Universal jurisdiction holds that 
these crimes—namely genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and 
torture—are considered “so harmful to international interests” and basic 
human rights that domestic courts anywhere in the world can prosecute 
them, and might be obligated to do so.66  As a result, a domestic court may 
apply universal jurisdiction irrespective of a crime’s location or the 
perpetrator’s nationality.67  Although rarely used,68 universal jurisdiction is 
nevertheless considered to be a very powerful concept that “holds promise 
for . . . justice for the victims of serious human rights violations around the 
world.”69
B.  The ICC 
 
Despite the development and growing prevalence of international 
criminal justice over the past seventy years, gaps and inefficiencies 
remained in the international community’s quest to prosecute the growing 
number of international crimes and atrocities.70
 
 61. Id. 
  In an attempt to close these 
 62. Id. at 391–92. 
 63. Id. at 392. 
 64. Id. 
 65. PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 14, at 16. 
 66. Id.  For instance, “[f]or crimes such as torture and grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions, the relevant treaties say clearly that offenders who are found within the 
territory of a state must be prosecuted or extradited to face prosecution elsewhere.” INT’L 
COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, HARD CASES:  BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS TO 
JUSTICE ABROAD, A GUIDE TO UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 37 (1999). 
 67. PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 14, at 16. 
 68. Courts have historically used universal jurisdiction in the context of the international 
crime of piracy. See Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction:  Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 121, 130 (2007) (citing United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 195–97 
(1820)).  In modern times, the most prominent use of universal jurisdiction occurred in 1999 
when Spain sought the extradition of Augusto Pinochet from England in order to prosecute 
him for human rights violations he committed as President of Chile. See generally INT’L 
COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, supra note 66, at 1–2, 29–34. 
 69. PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 14, at 18. 
 70. See Jessberger, supra note 19, at 210 (observing that international criminal tribunals 
are often subject to criticisms of “malfunctions and missed opportunities,” and that efforts to 
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gaps, the United Nations sought to create a permanent international criminal 
court.71
1.  Creating the ICC 
  This section introduces that court and describes some of its central 
features.  It first briefly describes the creation of the ICC.  It then introduces 
the Rome Statute, which provides the statutory basis for the ICC.  Finally, 
this section describes the ICC’s most important and distinctive feature:  the 
principle of complementarity. 
The U.N. first formulated the idea of a permanent international criminal 
court in 1948, when the General Assembly (GA) adopted Resolution 260.72  
In that Resolution, the GA recognized the need for an international criminal 
court and invited the International Law Commission (ILC) to study the 
possibility and desirability of establishing one.73  Although the ILC 
prepared several draft statutes pursuant to the Resolution, a number of 
factors caused the GA to put the idea on hold.74
This remained so until 1989 when Trinidad and Tobago, seeking a new 
means to prosecute drug trafficking, requested that the GA revisit the idea 
of a permanent international criminal court.
 
75  At that time, the ILC 
prepared another draft statute76 to be presented at a diplomatic 
conference.77  That conference, which met in Rome in the summer of 
1998,78 turned that draft into the statutory and legal blueprint for the ICC:  
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute or 
Statute).79
 
prosecute in domestic courts “have been highly selective, largely uncoordinated, and, in sum, 
not satisfactory”). 
 
 71. See Establishment of an International Criminal Court, supra note 17 (indicating that 
one of the central reasons for establishing the ICC was to remedy deficiencies in the current 
transitional justice landscape). 
 72. Bernaz & Prouvèze, supra note 22, at 323. 
 73. See Establishment of an International Criminal Court, supra note 17. 
 74. See Bernaz & Prouvèze, supra note 22, at 323–24 (citing, as reasons for the delay, 
the Cold War and a lack of a consensus over a definition of the crime of aggression). 
 75. See Establishment of an International Criminal Court, supra note 17. 
 76. Id.  The draft was prepared just after the Security Council established the ICTY and 
the ICTR, id., further demonstrating the impact these tribunals had on establishing the ICC. 
 77. See Bernaz & Prouvèze, supra note 22, at 324.  The GA established two ad hoc 
committees to review and consolidate the draft statute:  the Ad Hoc Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, and the Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court. Id. 
 78. Id. at 324–25.  The conference was formally called the United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference on Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 
(Rome Conference).  It met between June 15, 1998 and July 17, 1998. Id. 
 79. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 1, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 (amended 2010) [hereinafter Rome Statute], available at www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ADD16852-AEE9-4757-ABE7-9CDC7CF02886/283503/
RomeStatutEng1.pdf.  The Statute officially entered into force on July 1, 2002. See Bernaz 
and Prouvèze, supra note 22, at 332. 
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2.  The Rome Statute 
The Rome Statute is a carefully articulated, skillfully negotiated80 
document that not only created the ICC,81
The Statute first establishes the Court as “a permanent institution [with] 
the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious 
crimes of international concern.”
 but also established what kinds 
of cases the Court may hear, the process by which it hears them, and how 
the Court should deal with issues that it confronts.  While a comprehensive 
outline of the Rome Statute is beyond the scope of this Comment, this 
section describes its most salient features and provides a background for the 
issues that will confront the Court as its involvement in Libya progresses. 
82  The Statute then lists those crimes as 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of 
aggression,83 defining each with specificity.84  Structurally, although the 
ICC is a single institution, the Rome Statute divides it into four organs:  the 
Presidency, Chambers, Office of the Prosecutor, and Registry.85  While 
these organs work together to collectively achieve the Court’s objectives, 
they maintain their own responsibilities and immediate priorities.  For 
instance, the Chambers constitutes the judiciary of the ICC and, with its 
three subdivisions,86 is responsible for conducting trials and managing 
cases.87  The Prosecutor’s Office, on the other hand, operates independently 
from the Court88 and is responsible for investigating potential cases, 
conducting investigations, and advocating before the Court.89
 
 80. See generally Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 22 (1999); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Negotiating the Treaty of 
Rome on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 443 
(1999); Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, The Rome Conference on an International 
Criminal Court:  The Negotiating Process, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 2 (1999). 
 
 81. See Rome Statute, supra note 79, art. 1. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. art. 5.  The Court may not exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression until 
after January 1, 2017. Id. art. 15bis(3). 
 84. Even if a crime fits within these definitions, however, the Court may only exercise 
jurisdiction if certain conditions are satisfied.  For an overview of some of these conditions, 
see infra notes 118–28 and accompanying text.  For other examples of what aspects of a case 
may or may not prevent the ICC from having jurisdiction, see the Rome Statute, supra note 
79, art. 27(1) (extending jurisdiction over individuals regardless of their official capacity), 
art. 29 (declining to limit the ICC’s jurisdiction to the statute of limitations to which a crime 
might otherwise be subject), and art. 11 (declining jurisdiction if the crime was committed in 
a state before it became a Party to the Statute). 
 85. Rome Statute, supra note 79, art. 34. 
 86. The three subdivisions of the Chambers are the Pre-Trial Division, Trial Division, 
and Appeals Division. See id. art. 39.  The responsibilities of each division vary based on the 
stage of a particular case before the court. See id. 
 87. See id. 
 88. See id. art. 42(1) (“The Office of the Prosecutor shall act independently as a separate 
organ of the Court.”).  As a whole, the Court’s relationship to the U.N. mirrors the 
Prosecutor’s relationship with the ICC, in that while the ICC exists within the U.N. system, 
it operates as an independent institution. See id. pmbl. (establishing the ICC as an 
“independent permanent [court] in relationship with the [U]nited Nations system”). 
 89. See id. art. 42(1). 
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As of this writing, there are 120 States Parties to the Rome Statute.90  
Compared to the 105 states that were original signatories in 1998, and the 
60 that had ratified it as of July 1, 2002,91 the Court’s current membership 
demonstrates its growing support from the international community.92  And 
although the ICC has conducted only one full trial thus far,93 the Court has 
initiated trial proceedings in two more cases94 and investigated many 
others.95
3.  The Principle of Complementarity 
 
This section explains one of the most significant and unique features of 
the ICC:  the principle of complementarity.  The section begins by 
explaining the theoretical and practical bases for the principle.  The section 
then describes the manifestation of the principle in the Rome Statute. 
a.  The Theoretical and Practical Foundations of the Principle 
of Complementarity 
All of the Court’s work is guided by a single phrase in the Rome 
Statute—a phrase so important that it appears twice.  The preamble and 
article 1 both state that the ICC “shall be complementary to national 
criminal jurisdictions.”96  This statement is broadly referred to as the 
principle of complementarity, and, as many commentators have noted, it is 
the cornerstone of the Rome Statute and the foundation upon which the ICC 
is built.97
 
 90. See The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2012).  The United States is not 
currently a State Party to the Rome Statute. See id.  For an explanation of why the U.S. did 
not join, see Bartram S. Brown, U.S. Objections to the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court:  A Brief Response, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 855 (1999). 
 
 91. See Bernaz & Prouvèze, supra note 22, at 328. 
 92. See Judge Sang-Hyun Song, President of the Int’l Criminal Court, Address to the 
U.N. General Assembly 2 (Oct. 26, 2011), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CA5004-362D-4C37-86D8-01B6F6E7642B/283903/11026ICC
PresidentspeechtoUNGAENG.pdf (acknowledging his delight “that international support for 
the ICC has continued to grow”). 
 93. Id. at 3 (“The ICC’s first trial concluded in August [2011] with closing statements 
against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, charged with the use of child soldiers in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo.”).  The Court entered a guilty verdict against Dyilo on March 14, 
2012. Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of 
the Statute, ¶ 1358 (Mar. 14, 2012), www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf. 
 94. See Song, supra note 92 (noting that the presentation of evidence is “nearing its 
conclusion” in one trial, and that a third trial opened in November, 2010).  A fourth trial is in 
its preparation stages. See id. 
 95. See Situations and Cases, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases (last visited Mar. 23, 2012) (noting that, in total, 
“14 cases in 7 situations have been brought before the [ICC]”). 
 96. Rome Statute, supra note 79, pmbl., art. 1. 
 97. See, e.g., Jimmy Gurulé, United States Opposition to the 1998 Rome Statute 
Establishing an International Criminal Court:  Is the Court’s Jurisdiction Truly 
Complementary to National Criminal Jurisdictions?, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 7 (2002) 
(“The complementarity regime is one of the cornerstones on which the [ICC is] built.”); 
Michael A. Newton, Comparative Complementarity:  Domestic Jurisdiction Consistent with 
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In practice, this principle is meant to limit the ICC’s jurisdictional scope 
by giving primary jurisdiction over crimes to national criminal 
jurisdictions.98  This dynamic between the ICC and domestic courts stands 
in contrast to the operations of the ICTY and the ICTR,99 as their charters 
give them jurisdictional primacy over the domestic courts with whom they 
share jurisdiction.100
Considered against the backdrop of the ICC’s predecessor institutions, 
the complementarity principle thus reflects the Court’s somewhat 
paradoxical identity:  while the ICC is the most ambitious criminal court 
ever created in terms of the scope of its goals and the gravity of the crimes 
on which it focuses,
 
101 its power to actually try cases is limited by elements 
that are primarily outside of its control.102  Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the 
ICC’s first Chief Prosecutor, acknowledged this tension at his swearing-in 
ceremony on June 16, 2003 when he said, “As a consequence of 
complementarity, the number of cases that reach the Court should not be a 
measure of its efficiency.  On the contrary, the absence of trials before [the] 
Court, as a consequence of the regular functioning of national institutions, 
would be a major success.”103  Thus, given the Court’s broad ambition and 
status in the international criminal justice community, the ICC’s 
jurisdictional power has been described as timid.104
Drafters of the Statute, however, consciously constructed this timidity to 
serve both a theoretical and practical purpose.
 
105  Theoretically, the 
complementarity principle serves to demonstrate respect for the sovereignty 
of national jurisdictions.106  Practically, and perhaps more importantly in 
the eyes of some commentators, the complementarity principle allows the 
international criminal justice community to allocate its collective resources 
in ways that most efficiently and effectively achieve the Rome Statute’s 
fundamental goals.107
 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REV. 20, 29 (2001) (“The 
principle of complementarity is . . . the bridge that carries the weight of the Rome Statute.”). 
  The principle does this in a number of ways. 
 98. See Newton, supra note 97, at 26–29. 
 99. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
 100. For a discussion of the primacy of the ICTY, see Brown, supra note 59, at 395–96.  
For a discussion of the primacy of the ICTR, see Melman, supra note 38, at 1280–81. 
 101. See Rome Statute, supra note 79, pmbl., art. 1, art. 5 (highlighting the ICC’s 
commitment to fighting the world’s “most serious crimes”). 
 102. See INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER:  
THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY IN PRACTICE ¶ 1 (2003) [hereinafter INFORMAL EXPERT 
PAPER], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc654724.pdf (“The Statute 
recognizes that States have the first responsibility and right to prosecute international 
crimes.”). 
 103. Id. (quoting Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, Ceremony for the 
Solemn Undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor (June 16, 2003)). 
 104. Brown, supra note 90, at 878. 
 105. INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER, supra note 102, ¶ 1 (“The principle of complementarity is 
based both on respect for the primary jurisdiction of States and on considerations of 
efficiency and effectiveness . . . .”). 
 106. See Gregory S. Gordon, Complementarity and Alternative Justice, 88 OR. L. REV. 
621, 628 (2009). 
 107. Id. at 627–28; INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER, supra note 102, ¶¶ 1–2. 
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First, the ICC has limited resources in terms of financing, infrastructure, 
and personnel,108 and thus can only feasibly prosecute a small number of 
cases per year.109  Therefore, the sheer impossibility of the Court achieving 
its goals on its own necessitates that domestic courts share in the ICC’s 
responsibility.110  Moreover, it seems more efficient to give primary 
prosecutorial responsibility to domestic jurisdictions because they usually 
will have better access than the ICC to evidence and witnesses.111  Finally, 
the complementarity principle empowers domestic jurisdictions throughout 
the world and encourages them to build up their domestic judicial 
systems.112  In the long run, this allocation will ostensibly help the global 
community achieve the ICC’s fundamental goal of ending impunity for the 
world’s most serious crimes.113  For these reasons, the principle of 
complementarity fundamentally guides all of the ICC’s work.114
 
 108. Gordon, supra note 
 
106, at 627. 
 109. INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER, supra note 102, ¶ 1 (“[T]here are limits on the number of 
prosecutions the ICC . . . can feasibly conduct.”).  It is estimated that the ICC, given its 
resources, can only conduct two to three trials per year. Lisa J. Laplante, The Domestication 
of International Criminal Law:  A Proposal for Expanding the International Criminal 
Court’s Sphere of Influence, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 635, 636 (2010). 
 110. See Laplante, supra note 109, at 645. 
 111. See INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER, supra note 102, ¶ 1; see also Gordon, supra note 106, 
at 628 (“[T]hese domestic courts would likely have more means available to collar the 
accused and to collect the necessary evidence.”). 
 112. See Gordon, supra note 106, at 628 (“[C]omplementarity enlarges the field of battle 
against the culture of impunity by incentivizing a large number of domestic jurisdictions to 
become more operational and effective at investigating and prosecuting cases of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes.”). 
 113. See id. 
 114. There is some debate within the academic community as to the validity of this 
statement.  Specifically, it is unclear in the eyes of some commentators whether the ICC is 
required to comply with the principle of complementarity in cases that originate as referrals 
from the U.N. Security Council, pursuant to article 13(b) of the Rome Statute. See infra note 
125 and accompanying text.  Professor Michael A. Newton, for instance, argues that the ICC 
is not required to follow the principle of complementarity in such situations for two reasons:  
first, a U.N. referral operates as a mandate that, by virtue of article 103 of the U.N. Charter, 
all United Nations members must follow; second, in Council-referred cases, the ICC is not 
required to formally notify any State Party that it has initiated an investigation, according to 
article 18 of the Rome Statute. Newton, supra note 97, at 49; Michael A. Newton, The 
Complementarity Conundrum:  Are We Watching Evolution or Evisceration?, 8 SANTA 
CLARA J. INT’L L. 115, 130–31 (2010) [hereinafter Newton, Complementarity Conundrum] .  
Other commentators argue that because article 17 of the Rome Statute makes no distinction 
between Security Council referrals and other types of cases in the Court’s substantive 
admissibility analysis, the principle of complementarity applies equally to all cases. See 
Mark A. Summers, A Fresh Look at the Jurisdictional Provisions of the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court:  The Case for Scrapping the Treaty, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 57, 79–
80 (2001).  The Office of the Prosecutor has shed some light on the debate by concluding 
that technically the ICC is bound by the principle of complementarity in all cases because all 
cases are subject to the same substantive admissibility analysis. See INFORMAL EXPERT 
PAPER, supra note 102, ¶¶ 68–69.   Theoretically, however, the Security Council has the 
power to create jurisdictional primacy for the ICC, even within the framework of the 
complementarity principle, if it issues an order to the effect that member states must comply 
with requests from the ICC, and the ICC requests jurisdictional primacy. Id. ¶ 69.  But given 
the reverence the Court has displayed for the complementarity principle, and the lack of 
precedent that exists for the Security Council to issue such an order, see Elizabeth C. 
Minogue, Comment, Increasing the Effectiveness of the Security Council’s Chapter VII 
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b.  Manifestations of the Principle of Complementarity in the Rome Statute 
For all of its importance, the complementarity principle is not expressly 
defined anywhere in the Rome Statute.115  Thus, in order to understand how 
the ICC preserves the principle of complementarity, one must understand 
“the provisions of the Rome Statute that bear [the principle’s] 
fingerprints,”116 and how they interact to give life to the complementarity 
concept.117
i.  Jurisdiction 
  These provisions are those that outline (1) the requirements that 
must be met for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over a case, (2) the 
features of a case that might make it inadmissible, and (3) the procedural 
mechanisms that guide the Prosecutor and Court to those determinations. 
Before the ICC can have jurisdiction over a case, certain preconditions 
must be satisfied.118  These preconditions require, in certain cases,119 that 
either the state on whose territory the alleged crime took place (or if the 
crime was committed on a vessel or aircraft, the state where the vessel or 
aircraft is registered), or that the state of whom the alleged violator is a 
national is a party to the Statute.120  This requirement serves to ensure that 
when the ICC exercises jurisdiction over a crime, the state or states that 
might also have jurisdiction over the crime consent to, and accept, the 
ICC’s jurisdiction.121  If a state with jurisdiction over the crime happens not 
to be a party to the Statute, article 12’s preconditions may nevertheless be 
satisfied if the state affirmatively consents to the ICC’s jurisdiction.122
 
Authority in the Current Situations Before the International Criminal Court, 61 VAND. L. 
REV. 647, 673 (2008), for all practical purposes it seems that the ICC is bound by the 
principle of complementarity in Security Council referrals, just as it is in other cases. 
  
 115. See Newton, supra note 97, at 26; see also Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, 
Complementarity in Crisis:  Uganda, Alternative Justice, and the International Criminal 
Court, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 107, 134 (2009) (taking a slightly more cynical view of 
complementarity, the author notes that “[t]he ICC . . . is an institution structured on a 
relationship between national justice and international authority.  Yet it is this very 
relationship that the Rome Statute leaves fundamentally undefined, ultimately calling into 
question the very justifications invoked to create the ICC in the first place”). 
 116. Newton, supra note 97, at 48. 
 117. Id. at 45 (“Complementarity is an intellectually simple principle that cannot be 
distilled into one snippet of isolated treaty text.”). 
 118. Rome Statute, supra note 79, art. 12.  These preconditions are in addition to the 
basic requirement that the Court only has jurisdiction over certain types of crimes, see supra 
note 83 and accompanying text, committed after the Statute entered into force, see Rome 
Statute, supra note 79, art. 11. 
 119. The consent requirements in article 12(2) do not apply to cases referred to the ICC 
by the U.N. Security Council. See Rome Statute, supra note 79, art. 12(2) (excluding article 
13(b) from consideration); see also Newton, Complementarity Conundrum, supra note 114, 
at 127–28. 
 120. Rome Statute, supra note 79, art. 12(2). 
 121. Id. art. 12(1) (“A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the 
jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in article 5.”). 
 122. Id. art. 12(3) (“If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is 
required under paragraph 2, that State may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept 
the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in question.”). 
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Article 12 is thus a significant check on the ICC’s power in that it 
represents the notion “that the Court should not have jurisdiction where 
states involved have not consented to it.”123
Once a case meets these basic jurisdictional requirements, there are three 
circumstances that would allow the Court to actually exercise its 
jurisdiction over the case:  (1) if it is “referred to the Prosecutor by a State 
Party”
 
124 (state referral), (2) if it is “referred to the Prosecutor by the 
Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations”125 (Security Council referral), or (3) if “[t]he Prosecutor has 
initiated an investigation in respect of such a crime”126 (proprio motu 
investigation).127  These provisions, which provide multiple options for 
initiating cases, emphasize that the ICC is meant to be an independent 
institution whose authority and legitimacy are determined by legal and 
international justice principles rather than political considerations.128
ii.  Admissibility 
 
In addition to the jurisdictional requirements and preconditions that must 
be satisfied before the Court hears a case,129 the Rome Statute requires that 
a case also be admissible.130  The interplay between jurisdiction and 
admissibility is that the jurisdictional provisions give the Court power to 
hear certain cases, based upon the nature of the case, the parties involved, 
and how the case was initiated, while the admissibility requirement defines 
the Court’s ability to use that power.131  Practically, the admissibility 
regime helps guide the ICC in circumstances where it shares jurisdiction 
with domestic courts.132
 
 123. Newton, Complementarity Conundrum, supra note 
  Moreover, the admissibility requirement 
represents the essence of the complementarity principle and serves to 
114, at 127. 
 124. Rome Statute, supra note 79, art. 13(a). 
 125. Id. art. 13(b). 
 126. Id. art. 13(c). 
 127. Id. art. 15(1).  The elements of article 13—specifically the issue of how much 
control over ICC cases the U.N. Security Council would have—were subject to somewhat 
contentious negotiations. See Greenawalt, supra note 115, at 153–54.  For instance, many 
countries in attendance at the Rome Conference felt that giving too much power to the 
Security Council would politicize and ultimately undermine the work of the Court. Id.  That 
concern is reflected in article 13’s composition. Id. at 154. 
 128. See Greenawalt, supra note 115, at 153–54 (“The ostensible reason [that the drafters 
of the Rome Statute expanded case referrals beyond the Security Council] reflects 
the . . . concern . . . that mandatory Security Council referral ‘would reduce the credibility 
and moral authority of the court; excessively limit its role; . . . [and] introduce an 
inappropriate political influence over the functioning of the institution.’” (quoting Report of 
the Ad Hoc Comm. on the Establishment of an Int’l Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., 
Supp. No. 22, ¶ 121, U.N. Doc. A/50/22 (1995))). 
 129. See Newton, Complementarity Conundrum, supra note 114, at 131 (noting that the 
Rome Statute’s jurisdictional requirements are a “legal inquiry distinct from admissibility”). 
 130. Rome Statute, supra note 79, art. 17. 
 131. See Newton, supra note 97, at 52. 
 132. See id. 
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directly implement that principle in the Rome Statute.133  The admissibility 
regime achieves this goal by providing both substantive guidelines and a 
procedural mechanism through which to apply them.134
Cases are presumed to be admissible.
 
135  The Rome Statute therefore 
speaks of admissibility in terms of what would make a case inadmissible.136
 (a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has 
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to 
carry out the investigation or prosecution;  
  
Article 17 lays out the criteria the Court considers in making that 
determination, establishing that a case over which the Court has jurisdiction 
is nevertheless inadmissible in four circumstances: 
 (b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction 
over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, 
unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the 
State genuinely to prosecute;  
 (c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is 
the subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted 
under article 20, paragraph 3;  
 (d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the 
Court.137
Emphasizing that these substantive elements of admissibility are a direct 
reflection of the complementarity principle, the Rome Statute instructs the 
Court, in considering this criteria, to have “regard to paragraph 10 of the 
Preamble and article 1,”
 
138  each of which states that the Court “shall be 
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.”139
The two most significant substantive concepts within admissibility are 
reflected in articles 17(1)(a) and 17(1)(b).
 
140
 
 133. See William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity:  The International 
Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of International Justice, 49 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 53, 76–82 (2008) (describing the statutory basis for complementarity in terms of 
the Rome Statute’s admissibility criteria); Gordon, supra note 
  These provisions establish 
106, at 629–30 
(“Complementarity is operationalized in the form of an admissibility examination set forth in 
[the Rome Statute].”); Newton, supra note 97, at 52 (“The admissibility mechanism provides 
the most direct implementation of the complementarity principle in the Rome Statute.”); 
Newton, Complementarity Conundrum, supra note 114, at 126 (“[T]he text of Article 17 
articulates the [States Parties’] agreed upon framework for assessing the balance of authority 
and implicitly preserves the preference of the drafters for domestic power.”). 
 134. See Gordon, supra note 106, at 630–34. 
 135. Summers, supra note 114, at 69 (“The statutory scheme of the ICC presumes 
admissibility.”). But cf. Gregory S. McNeal, ICC Inability Determinations in Light of the 
Dujail Case, 39 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 325, 326 (2006) (“Nations are presumed capable to 
prosecute cases.”). 
 136. See Rome Statute, supra note 79, art. 17. 
 137. Id. art. 17(1)(a)–(d). 
 138. Id. art. 17(1). 
 139. Id. pmbl., art. 1. 
 140. The other two substantive aspects of admissibility, which do not garner as much 
scholarly attention but nevertheless contribute significantly to the cohesiveness of the 
admissibility regime, state that a case is inadmissible if “[t]he [defendant] has already been 
tried for conduct which is the subject of the complaint,” id. art. 17(1)(c), or if it “is not of 
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that the ICC may only hear a case if its judges determine that the domestic 
state with jurisdiction over that case is “unwilling or unable genuinely141 to 
carry out the investigation or prosecution.”142
 (a)  The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national 
decision was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from 
criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court . . . ; 
  With respect to the first 
prong, article 17(2) instructs the Court that a state is “unwilling” to 
prosecute or investigate if one of the following three scenarios exists: 
 (b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the 
circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned 
to justice;  
 (c)  The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently 
or impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner which, 
in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice.143
The Prosecutor’s Office has characterized the “unwillingness” 
determination as complicated and “technically difficult,” for it will often 
require the Court to infer its conclusions from highly circumstantial 
evidence, and those conclusions will often implicate “politically sensitive” 
issues.
 
144
 
sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court,” id. art. 17(1)(d).  Article 17(1)(c) 
refers to the concept of ne bis in idem, which is conceptually similar to the notion of “double 
jeopardy.” See Gregory S. Gordon, Toward an International Criminal Procedure:  Due 
Process Aspirations and Limitations, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 635, 687–88 (2007) 
(citing Sean D. Murphy, Progress and Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 57, 79 n.43 (1999) (“[Ne] bis in idem 
addresses the possibility of repeated prosecutions for the same conduct in different legal 
systems, whereas double jeopardy generally refers to repeated prosecutions for the same 
conduct in the same legal system.”)).  The Rome Statute’s adherence to ne bis in idem, fully 
articulated in article 20, presents a significant limitation on the Court’s power vis-á-vis 
national criminal jurisdictions and also provides substantive due process protections for 
individual defendants. See id. at 687–89.  Article 17’s “sufficient gravity” requirement is 
also an important element of admissibility, and, according to commentators, is another 
requirement that demonstrates the Court’s commitment to complementarity. See Newton, 
supra note 
 
97, at 38–39; Newton, Complementarity Conundrum, supra note 114, at 134–35. 
 141. Meant to modify the terms “to carry out” and “to prosecute,” see INFORMAL EXPERT 
PAPER, supra note 102, ¶ 21, “genuinely” injects a subjective element into the Court’s 
admissibility requirement that some commentators find potentially problematic, see McNeal, 
supra note 135, at 327–28; Newton, supra note 97, at 63–64 (describing how the Prosecutor, 
without any institutional constraints, could potentially take advantage of that language); 
Summers, supra note 114, at 76–77.  The Prosecutor’s Office downplays these concerns and 
contends that “genuinely” properly balances the principle of complementarity with the 
Court’s fundamental goal of ending impunity. See INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER, supra note 102, 
¶ 22 (describing how “genuinely” serves the Court’s need to assess the quality of national 
proceedings, but does so by setting the standard low enough that domestic courts can reach it 
if they are serious about achieving the same goals as the ICC). 
 142. Rome Statute, supra note 79, art. 17(1)(a). 
 143. Id. art. 17(2)(a)–(c). 
 144. See INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER, supra note 102, ¶ 14.  This document also provides a 
detailed list of indicia for the “unwilling and unable” determination. See id. at 28–31. 
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The Court’s “unable” determination is ostensibly more 
straightforward.145  To make such a determination, the Rome Statute directs 
the Court to “consider whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or 
unavailability of its national judicial system, the state is unable to obtain the 
accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to 
carry out its proceedings.”146  To further assist the Court in this inquiry, the 
Prosecutor’s Office has highlighted certain factors it finds particularly 
relevant to determining if a national judicial system is “unavailable”:  “lack 
of necessary personnel, judges, investigators, prosecutor; lack of judicial 
infrastructure; lack of substantive or procedural penal legislation . . . ; lack 
of access [to the system]; obstruction by uncontrolled elements . . . ; and 
amnesties [or] immunities.”147
iii.  Procedural Mechanisms 
 
As significant as the Rome Statute’s substantive representations of the 
complementarity principle are, in practice they are only as effective as the 
procedural mechanism the Statute has in place to protect them.  That 
mechanism consists primarily of articles 53, 18, and 19. 
Article 53 lays out the first steps the Prosecutor must take in order to 
initiate any investigation.148  Specifically, it instructs the Prosecutor that, 
upon receiving a referral from a State Party149 or the Security Council,150 or 
before beginning the process of initiating an investigation on his own,151 he 
shall evaluate all the information available to him and decide if there is a 
reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation.152  In making that 
decision, the Prosecutor is instructed to consider three factors:  whether (a) 
it is reasonable to believe a crime has been or is being committed that falls 
within the Court’s jurisdiction;153 (b) “[t]he case is or would be admissible 
under article 17;”154 and (c) considering “the gravity of the crime and the 
interests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that 
an investigation would not serve the interests of justice.”155
In most instances,
 
156 if the Prosecutor decides to investigate a situation, 
article 18 requires him to notify all states that would normally have 
jurisdiction over it of his decision.157
 
 145. Id. at 15 (“An ‘inability’ assessment is likely to be less complex than an 
‘unwillingness’ assessment . . . .”). 
  If those states have already begun an 
 146. Rome Statute, supra note 79, art. 17(3). 
 147. INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER, supra note 102, ¶ 50. 
 148. Rome Statute, supra note 79, art. 53. 
 149. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 150. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 151. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 152. Rome Statute, supra note 79, art. 53(1). 
 153. Id. art. 53(1)(a). 
 154. Id. art. 53(1)(b). 
 155. Id. art. 53(1)(b).  The Prosecutor may also conduct a similar inquiry at any point 
during the investigation as more information becomes available. Id. art. 53(2). 
 156. See infra note 161 and accompanying text (indicating that article 18 does not apply 
to Security Council referrals). 
 157. Rome Statute, supra note 79, art. 18(1). 
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investigation of their own, they may request that the Prosecutor defer 
entirely to them.158  That request will be granted so long as the Pre-Trial 
Chamber determines that the state is willing and able to carry out the 
investigation and prosecution genuinely.159  This process constitutes the 
Court’s preliminary ruling on admissibility.160
Article 18, however, does not apply to investigations that begin as 
Security Council referrals.
 
161  Thus, the Court’s first determination on the 
admissibility of a Council-referred case comes under article 19, either on 
the Court’s own motion162 or as a result of a challenge to admissibility.163  
Challenges can come from three potential sources, including “[a] State 
which has jurisdiction over a case, on the ground that it is investigating or 
prosecuting the case.”164  These challenges, which may only be made once 
and before the start of a trial,165 have the effect of suspending the 
Prosecutor’s investigation until the Court makes a ruling.166
II.  EXPLORING THE ICC’S FOUNDING PRINCIPLES AND GOALS 
 
Given the ICC’s brief history and relatively limited experience 
conducting investigations and prosecuting cases, the Court has had few 
opportunities to put the aforementioned provisions of the Rome Statute to 
work.  Of the aspects of the Rome Statute that remain untested in practice, 
two are especially significant:  those containing the principle of 
complementarity, and those outlining the Court’s ultimate goal of ending 
impunity. 
Part II of this Comment explains the different ways to conceptualize 
these two central concepts, with the hope that elucidating them and 
exploring the ways in which they can be interpreted will help readers and 
members of the international criminal justice community think about how 
 
 158. Id. art. 18(2). 
 159. Id. art. 18(2)–(3). 
 160. See id. art. 18.  This initial ruling on admissibility is open to review as circumstances 
change with respect to a state’s ability or willingness to investigate and prosecute. Id. art. 
18(3)–(4). 
 161. Id.  art. 18(1) (referring to articles 13(a) and 13(c), but not 13(b)).  The likely reason 
for not requiring notice in Security Council referrals is that “[i]n practice, the process of 
generating a [Security Council] Chapter VII resolution would almost certainly give notice to 
the affected states.” Newton, supra note 97, at 55. 
 162. Rome Statute, supra note 79, art. 19(1) (“The Court may, on its own motion, 
determine the admissibility of a case in accordance with article 17.”).  The fact that the Court 
is not obligated to make a formal admissibility ruling, either in article 19 or article 18, is 
consistent with the notion that cases are presumed to be admissible to the ICC. See supra 
notes 135–39 and accompanying text.  In contrast, article 19 makes clear that the Court must 
ensure that it has jurisdiction over any case brought before it. See Rome Statute, supra note 
79, art. 19(1). 
 163. Id. art. 19(2). 
 164. Id. art. 19)(2)(b).  The other two potential sources of a challenge are “[a]n accused or 
a person for whom a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear has been issued,” id. art. 
19(2)(a), and “[a] State from which acceptance of jurisdiction is required under article 12,” 
id. art. 19(2)(c). 
 165. Id. art. 19(4). 
 166. Id. art. 19(7). 
2288 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
the ICC can most effectively put them into practice.  Part II.A presents 
competing conceptualizations of the principle of complementarity, while 
Part II.B discusses the Court’s fundamental goal of ending impunity. 
A.  Competing Conceptualizations of Complementarity 
By building itself around the principle of complementarity, the ICC 
“reflects the notion that the sovereign nations of the world are joined . . . as 
interdependent components of a larger global civil society . . . to promote 
values fundamental to all democratic and peace-loving states.”167
1.  “Classic” (Passive) Complementarity 
  
Determining exactly how the complementarity principle defines the 
working relationship of those components, however, is another challenge 
entirely.  Although the general concept behind the complementarity 
principle, and even the principle’s manifestation in the Rome Statute, are 
relatively clear, the principle’s role in actually defining how the Court goes 
about its business remains subject to interpretation.  This section outlines 
two interpretations of how, in practice, the complementarity principle can 
be conceptualized. 
The prevailing interpretation of how the principle of complementarity 
defines the ICC’s relationship with national criminal jurisdictions can be 
called “passive complementarity.”168  Under this interpretation, the ICC is 
effectively a “‘safety net’ in place for those rare cases where no national 
court system is willing and able to investigate allegations of serious 
international crimes.”169  Commentators who support this notion refer to 
the ICC as a “last resort court,”170 a court modestly designed to fill the gaps 
where domestic courts are inadequate or fail in their responsibilities,171 and 
“an additional [or substitute] forum [within the international system] for 
dispensing justice.”172
Proponents of this approach to complementarity ordinarily cite, as 
shorthand for the principle itself, the “unwilling or unable” feature of the 
Rome Statute’s admissibility analysis under article 17.
 
173
 
 167. Laplante, supra note 
  Effectively, this 
interpretation construes the complementarity principle as a restriction on the 
109, at 649 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER, supra note 102, ¶ 6 (“The principle of 
complementarity . . . prompts a network of . . . States Parties and other States to carry out 
consistent and rigorous national proceedings.”). 
 168. See Burke-White, supra note 133, at 56. 
 169. Brown, supra note 90, at 878. 
 170. See, e.g., Julie B. Martin, The International Criminal Court:  Defining 
Complementarity and Divining Implications for the United States, 4 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. 
REV. 107, 109 (2006). 
 171. See Gurulé, supra note 97, at 6–7. 
 172. Newton, supra note 97, at 72. 
 173. See, e.g., Gurulé, supra note 97, at 7–8; Martin, supra note 170, at 108–09. 
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Court’s power, telling it when it may not act and when it should instead 
defer to a State Party.174
2.  Proactive Complementarity 
 
In contrast with the “passive” vision of complementarity is the notion 
that complementarity is actually an empowering mechanism for the ICC 
rather than a restrictive one, allowing it to actively effectuate its vision of 
justice throughout the world.175  Professor William Burke-White, who 
introduced this view and termed it “proactive complementarity,” posits that 
the ICC should use the principle of complementarity to “participate more 
directly in efforts to encourage national governments to prosecute 
international crimes themselves.”176  This concept envisions the ICC as an 
international criminal justice catalyst, instead of as a court with purely 
passive adjudicatory responsibilities.177
In effect, Burke-White argues, conceptualizing the Court in such a way 
would expand the ICC’s role beyond its classic formulation as just another 
fixture in the international justice community and ultimately create a “tiered 
system of prosecutorial authority.”
 
178  As the leader of that system, the ICC 
would then be in a position to cooperate with domestic courts from the 
beginning stages of an investigation and help them prosecute international 
crimes.179  Such a policy, he urges, is not only legally consistent with the 
existing framework of the Rome Statute,180 but would also allow the Court 
to maximize its resources as well as its broader impact on the international 
criminal justice community.181
Proponents of this proactive complementarity concept contend that it 
fulfills the principle’s basic purposes and the Court’s fundamental goals 
more effectively than its passive counterpart.  As Professor Lisa J. Laplante 
explains, by involving domestic states in investigations and prosecutions to 
the greatest extent possible, proactive complementarity allows the party 
with the best access to evidence, witnesses, and local knowledge to 
participate in an investigation and trial.
 
182  In so doing, it advances one of 
the fundamental reasons for having the principle in the first place.183
 
 174. See Newton, Complementarity Conundrum, supra note 
 
114, at 123 
(“[C]omplementarity is best viewed as a restrictive principle rather than an empowering one 
. . . .”). 
 175. See Burke-White, supra note 133, at 54–56. 
 176. Id. at 54.  Professor Lisa J. Laplante concurs with Professor Burke-White that this is 
how the ICC should conceptualize the complementarity principle. See Laplante, supra note 
109, at 638.  She also proposes extending the idea even further and applying it to situations 
over which the Court lacks jurisdiction under Article 11, as well as situations that are 
inadmissible under Article 17. See id. 
 177. See Burke-White, supra note 133, at 56. 
 178. Burke-White refers to this system as the “Rome System of Justice.” See id. at 57. 
 179. See id. at 54–56. 
 180. See id. at 76–85. 
 181. See id. at 56. 
 182. See Laplante, supra note 109, at 645. 
 183. See supra notes 108–14 and accompanying text (explaining the impossibility of the 
ICC achieving its goals on its own). 
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Furthermore, Laplante urges that using the principle of complementarity 
proactively would allow the ICC to enjoy the benefits of a national trial 
alongside the benefits of international expertise, similar to a hybrid 
tribunal.184  By allowing legal proceedings to be run at the national level, 
she claims, the ICC would thus enjoy a greater perception of legitimacy and 
would also provide a richer and more satisfying type of justice for the local 
population.185
As the Office of the Prosecutor’s informal expert paper on 
complementarity demonstrates,
 
186 this proactive approach to the 
complementarity principle is not an abstract product of legal academia.  
Rather, based on some of the paper’s recommendations, it appears that the 
ICC has contemplated some of the same ideas.  For one, the paper 
encourages the Chief Prosecutor to establish partnerships with domestic 
court systems whereby the ICC would directly advise187 and assist States in 
initiating and carrying out domestic prosecutions.188  This type of 
relationship, which the paper makes clear is consistent with the Rome 
Statute,189 could also yield more long-term “cooperative anti-impunity 
strategies” between the Prosecutor and domestic institutions.190
The paper further supports the concept of proactive complementarity by 
suggesting that the Prosecutor, in addition to assisting states during actual 
investigations and prosecutions, could also provide training to those 
states.
 
191  While acknowledging that this kind of cooperation might exceed 
the Prosecutor’s express responsibilities, the paper nevertheless finds that 
“such training would advance the overall objective of building a network of 
[s]tates able to carry out effective prosecutions.”192  The paper encourages 
such a training policy as long as it does not appear to divert resources from 
the Court’s more explicit mandates.193
The paper does acknowledge some of the risks that a policy of proactive 
complementarity might pose in the context of the Court’s article 17 
admissibility analysis.
 
194
 
 184. See supra notes 
  The paper recognizes that if the ICC is actively 
engaged in the domestic court system throughout an investigation, it may 
not be able to extricate itself from that system in order to conduct an 
44–46 and accompanying text. 
 185. See Laplante, supra note 109, at 645. 
 186. INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER, supra note 102. 
 187. Id. ¶ 11 (“Providing technical advice [about investigating and prosecuting mass 
crimes] would also be generally consistent with the Prosecutor’s mandate.”). 
 188. Id. ¶ 3. 
 189. Id. ¶ 10 (citing Rome Statute, supra note 79, art. 93(10)). 
 190. Id. ¶ 3. 
 191. See id. ¶ 12. 
 192. Id.  The paper additionally suggests that the Prosecutor may act as an intermediary 
between States, helping them coordinate and complete their own domestic proceedings even 
if the ICC would not otherwise be involved in the prosecutions. Id. ¶ 13.  This suggestion, 
and the level of cooperation between ICC and domestic courts it entails, echoes what 
Professor Burke-White conceptualizes to be the logical end of a policy of proactive 
complementarity:  the “Rome System of Justice.” See Burke-White, supra note 133, at 56–
57. 
 193. See INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER, supra note 102, ¶ 12. 
 194. See id. ¶ 14. 
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impartial admissibility analysis.195  On the other hand, the paper observes 
that the benefits associated with this conduct, such as encouraging fair, 
efficient, and effective avenues for criminal justice at the domestic level, 
outweigh the risks as long as the ICC is careful to take precautions against 
them.196
B.  The Court’s Quest to End Impunity 
 
Complementarity is the principle that guides the ICC to its goals, but it is 
not a goal in and of itself.  This section explains the most fundamental of 
the ICC’s goals—ending impunity for the world’s most serious crimes—
and explores a number of ways in which the ICC might address it. 
As expressed in the preamble to the Rome Statute, the ICC’s most 
fundamental goal is ensuring that “the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole . . . [do] not go unpunished.”197  Based 
on this language, the Court could be understood as simply a logical 
extension of the international tribunals that came before it, concerned 
narrowly with prosecuting certain crimes over which it has jurisdiction.198
First, various phrases in the preamble indicate that the ICC’s ultimate 
aim in prosecuting international criminals extends beyond pure punishment 
and retribution for single crimes.  Instead, the preamble makes clear that the 
Court’s focus in ending impunity is “to guarantee lasting respect for and the 
enforcement of international justice,”
  
But commentators, the ICC President, and surrounding provisions in the 
Rome Statute suggest that the Court was designed with broader goals in 
mind. 
199 for the benefit of both “present and 
future generations.”200  Supporting this long-term focus, the U.N. has 
explained that the ICC was created for the broader purpose of ensuring 
peace and justice, deterring all future war criminals, and ending conflicts 
altogether.201
 
 195. See id. 
  Commentators have further echoed this sentiment, 
proclaiming that the ICC is “focused not simply on the goal of giving 
particular defendants their deserved punishments, but also on the broader 
aspiration[s of] . . . facilitat[ing] society-wide transformation by breaking 
 196. See id. 
 197. Rome Statute, supra note 79, pmbl. 
 198. See George P. Fletcher & Jens David Ohlin, The ICC—Two Courts in One?, 4 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 428, 432 (2006) (arguing that a plausible way to think about the ICC is 
simply as a “logical culmination” of the Security Council’s program to restore peace and 
security following the ICTY and the ICTR); Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice in a New 
Era, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 893, 902–03 (2003) (“The ICC can be understood to symbolize 
the entrenchment of the exceptional Nuremburg Nazi War Crime Tribunals as a model for 
the creation of a standing international war crimes tribunal to prosecute war crimes under the 
international law of conflict.”). 
 199. Rome Statute, supra note 79, pmbl. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Establishment of an International Criminal Court, supra note 17. 
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cycles of violence, delegitimizing criminal regimes, and fostering peaceful 
societies rooted in the rule of law.”202
So articulated, the ICC’s ultimate goals are often considered in relation to 
the concept of transitional, or post-conflict, justice.
 
203  Transitional justice 
is a rapidly growing academic discipline204 that refers, in its simplest terms, 
to the conception of justice that emerges from periods of dramatic political 
change “as reflected [by] primarily legal responses that deal with the 
wrongdoing of repressive predecessor regimes.”205  Transitional justice 
works within a larger system that seeks to achieve “truth, justice, 
reconciliation and peace” in conflict-ridden societies.206  The fundamental 
goals of that system are to rehabilitate and provide closure to victims, and 
to allow societies to rebuild and liberalize.207  This process, it is thought, 
cannot truly take place unless violators for past crimes are held accountable 
for their actions.208
As an institution committed to achieving accountability and international 
criminal justice, the ICC recognizes the importance of promoting and 
implementing transitional justice principles throughout the world.
 
209
 
 202. Greenawalt, supra note 
  
Commentators similarly recognize this connection between the ICC and 
115, at 128 (citing RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 28 
(2000)); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction, in 1 PURSUIT OF INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 14, at xiii, xiv (framing the ICC’s mission broadly in order to 
link the ICC’s capacity for international justice with the goals it sets out in the Preamble); 
Laplante, supra note 109, at 640. 
 203. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Assessing Conflict Outcomes:  Accountability and 
Impunity, in 1 PURSUIT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 3, 7 n.5 
(referring to transitional justice as post-conflict justice); Gordon, supra note 106, at 628; 
Teitel, supra note 198, at 902–03. 
 204. See Lars Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity:  Rethinking Local Justice as 
Transitional Justice, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 6 (2006) (observing the “burgeoning literature on 
transitional justice”). 
 205. Teitel, supra note 198, at 893; see also TEITEL, supra note 202, at 5–6 (describing the 
fundamental nature of transitional justice); Zachary D. Kaufman, The Future of Transitional 
Justice, 1 ST. ANTONY’S INT’L R. 58, 58 (2005), available at http://users.ox.ac.uk/~
stair/1_1/kaufman.pdf (“Transitional justice involves states and societies shifting from a 
situation of conflict to one of peace and, in the process, using judicial and/or non-judicial 
mechanisms to address past human rights violations.”). 
 206. Bassiouni, supra note 203, at 7. 
 207. See Bassiouni, supra note 202, at xiv (describing the goals of “promot[ing] 
accountability and rehabilitation for countries emerging from conflict and for victim groups 
in need of closure”). 
 208. Bassiouni, supra note 203, at 7 (“[Transitional] justice is premised on an 
understanding that domestic stability, security and democratic governance in the aftermath of 
atrocity are strengthened by a commitment to accountability.”). 
 209. The ICC’s current President, Judge Sang-Hyun Song, said recently in a speech to the 
World Bank Group that “[l]asting peace and prosperity in . . . post-conflict societies can only 
be achieved if development challenges and justice enforcement are addressed in a 
coordinated manner.” See Judge Sang-Hyun Song, President of the Int’l Criminal Court, 
Keynote Address:  Law, Justice and Development Week 2011, World Bank 9 (Nov. 14, 
2011), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/038425E6-C9DD-465E-953C-
C56A81091D0C/0/111114ICCPresidentKeynoteSpeechAtWorldBank.pdf. 
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more general transitional justice principles,210 and urge the Court to make 
transitional justice an even more explicit feature of its goals.211
There is, however, an inherent difficulty in identifying the ICC with 
transitional justice so directly.
 
212  As most commentators who study this 
area emphasize, transitional justice is highly contextualized and particular 
to a given society’s conditions,213 and is often defined by the conflict 
itself.214  Thus, experts recognize that “there is no ‘one size fits all’ 
approach to [transitional] justice.”215  So for any transitional justice regime 
to be successful, it is important for it to be sensitive to local conditions and 
needs, and flexible enough to meet those needs.216
As an independent, centralized, and supranational institution, the ICC 
appears to some to be removed from these localized conditions and thus ill-
suited to provide comprehensive transitional justice solutions.
 
217  
Therefore, in order to remedy this perceived deficiency in the ICC’s 
structure, some commentators have encouraged the ICC to actively 
coordinate with domestic courts and other members of the international 
criminal justice community.218  This coordination, they hope, will ensure 
that the ICC’s conception of justice incorporates local needs and promotes 
long term, holistic solutions to the problems that gross international crimes 
generate.219
III.  LIBYA 
 
Part III describes the situation in Libya—a situation in which the ICC is 
currently involved and which raises some acute issues related to the themes 
discussed in Part II.  Part III.A begins by describing the political and social 
landscape in Libya following the nation’s recent revolution.  Part III.B then 
explains the ICC’s involvement in Libya to date, focusing on the upcoming 
trial of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi220
 
 210. See Bassiouni, supra note 
 and introducing the various options that 
exist for where and how to try him. 
202, at xiv; Teitel, supra note 198, at 903 (“The 
establishment of the ICC . . . is . . . a sign of the normalization of post-conflict law as the 
global rule of law.”). 
 211. See Bassiouni, supra note 202, at xiv (explaining that framing the ICC’s mission 
broadly to encompass transitional justice goals brings the Court more in line with the goals 
the Rome Statute sets out in its preamble). 
 212. See Teitel, supra note 198, at 900. 
 213. See id. at 896–97. 
 214. In her book, Transitional Justice, Ruti Teitel articulates this notion by observing the 
paradoxical nature of law as it relates to transitional justice:  “In its ordinary social function, 
law provides order and stability, but in extraordinary periods of political upheaval, law 
maintains order even as it enables transformation.” TEITEL, supra note 202, at 6. 
 215. Bassiouni, supra note 203, at 8. 
 216. See id. 
 217. See id. 
 218. See id. 
 219. See id.; Gordon, supra note 106, at 678–79. 
 220. Parts III and IV focus solely on Saif’s case because Al-Senussi’s situation is 
significantly more uncertain.  Al-Senussi was captured in Mauritania on March 17, 2012, but 
his ultimate destination is unclear; Libya, France, and the ICC all seek to extradite and 
prosecute him. See Laurent Prieur & Taha Zargoun, Libya Says Gaddafi Spy Chief Arrested 
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A.  Libya’s Current Political and Legal Landscape 
After forty-two years of oppression and nine months of revolution, Libya 
finally liberated itself from Muammar Gaddafi’s reign on October 23, 
2011.221  The National Transitional Council (NTC), the interim government 
established on March 5, 2011 to guide Libya through the conflict and 
toward a permanent democratic government,222 has begun the process of 
stabilizing the nation.  On October 31, 2011, its fifty-one members elected 
Abdel Rahim el-Keeb to the position of interim prime minister.223  
According to the timeline the NTC established for itself, el-Keeb and his 
cabinet are charged with conducting elections by June 2012 for an interim 
national assembly.224  That assembly will then spend one year drafting a 
new constitution, which it will put to a referendum in mid-2013.225  Around 
that same time, the NTC also hopes to have a full parliamentary election.226
But while Libya is moving toward a permanent, stable democracy, the 
current state of affairs indicates that the road to that end is not without 
bumps.
 
227  Despite Gaddafi’s death and Libya’s formal liberation,228 much 
of the violence continues.229  For instance, many local militias who fought 
to overthrow Gaddafi have refused to put down their weapons until an 
elected government is freely and fairly established.230
 
in Mauritania, REUTERS (Mar. 17, 2012, 6:56 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/
17/us-libya-senussi-idUSBRE82G07Q20120317.  Meanwhile, Saif is in custody in Libya. 
See infra notes 
  As a result, fighting 
247–48 and accompanying text.  
 221. Libya — Revolution and Aftermath, supra note 5 (“The country was formally 
declared liberated three days [after Gaddafi’s death].”). 
 222. LIBYAN INTERIM NAT’L COUNCIL, http://www.ntclibya.org/english/ (last visited Mar. 
23, 2012). 
 223. David D. Kirkpatrick, Libya Names an Engineer as Premier, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 
2011, at A11.  El-Keeb succeeded the NTC’s first prime minister, Mahmoud Jibril, who had 
promised to resign after Libya’s formal liberation from Gaddafi’s rule. Id. 
 224. Id.  This assembly will consist of roughly 200 people. Alastair Macdonald, Fearing 
Libya Vacuum, Ex-PM Urges Rapid Vote, REUTERS (Nov. 16, 2011, 10:45 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/16/us-libya-jibril-idUSTRE7AF16S20111116. 
 225. See Macdonald, supra note 224.  Jibril, the former interim prime minister, has 
spoken out against this plan for fear that any delay in establishing a permanent government 
will only subject the nation to more insecurity. See id.  As an alternative plan, Jibril proposes 
that the unelected NTC expand to about 130 members by including representatives from 
various factions within the country, and then draft a constitution. See id. 
 226. See id. 
 227. See, e.g., Moni Basu, Libyans Face Tough Challenges in Building a New Nation, 
CNN (Jan. 26, 2012), http://articles.cnn.com/2012-01-26/africa/world_africa_libya-
challenges_1_national-transitional-council-libyan-cities-libyan-uprising?_s=PM:AFRICA 
(noting various “signs that Libya faces challenges on several fronts as it struggles to craft a 
new nation from the ashes of tyranny”). 
 228. See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text. 
 229. See, e.g., Liam Stack, Pro-government Libyan Militia Routed from a Qaddafi 
Bastion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2012, at A10 (describing one violent episode that represents a 
“renewed conflict between revolutionary forces and those supportive of [Gaddafi]”). 
 230. David D. Kirkpatrick, In Libya, Fighting May Outlast the Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 2, 2011, at A4 (“Many members of military councils insist that they need to stay armed 
until a new constitution is ratified because they do not trust the weak provisional government 
to steer Libya to democracy on its own.”); Mark Lowen, Libya’s Ex-rebels Reluctant to 
Down Arms, BBC NEWS (Jan. 6, 2012, 8:49 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-
16443441. 
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in some parts of the country has continued between these militias and a few 
remaining Gaddafi loyalists.231  And with the country’s first true national 
army only in its infancy, putting down these skirmishes and ending the 
fragmentation the militias represent appears a long way off.232
Further preventing the NTC from fully stabilizing the country are the 
revenge killings that these militias and other vigilantes have embarked on 
against people thought to have supported Gaddafi.
 
233  At the site of one 
such killing, plastic ties were found next to the victims’ bodies, suggesting 
that militia members tied the victims’ hands behind their backs before 
executing them.234  Although the NTC has denounced this kind of conduct 
as antithetical to its central mission, and has urged its citizens to use the 
justice system for redress, it has nevertheless been slow to investigate, let 
alone stop, this behavior.235
Another problem facing the NTC is that even if people heeded its 
instructions and sought retribution in the justice system, it is unclear if a 
proper legal system exists that can adequately handle these disputes.
 
236  
Under Gaddafi, Libya’s judicial system mirrored its political system in that 
everything revolved around the leader.237  During his reign, the country’s 
“constitution” consisted essentially of Gaddafi’s personal book of political 
thoughts, and “trials” more closely resembled tribal negotiations than 
formal proceedings.238  Now, after over four decades of deliberate 
repression and erosion of the nation’s public institutions, observers worry 
that Libya lacks a viable judicial system.239
As for the makeshift judicial system that is in place, concerns abound 
regarding its treatment of prisoners and its adherence to due process 
 
 
 231. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 230 (describing reports of sporadic skirmishes between 
local militias); see also Basu, supra note 227 (noting that as frustration continues to grow 
throughout the country, “[c]lashes between pro- and anti-Gadhafi forces have turned lethal”). 
 232. See Clifford Krauss, Libya Tries to Build Army that Can March Straight and Defang 
Militias, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2011, at A4.  A captain in the new army expressed doubt 
about its ability to successfully get these militias to surrender their guns, and noted that 
stability in Libya is unlikely until this happens. Id.; see also Anthony Shadid, Libya 
Struggles to Curb Militias as Chaos Grows, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2012, at A1. 
 233. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 599 (“Revenge attacks against 
populations deemed to have supported Gaddafi also grew in September and October.”); 
Maria Golovnina, Analysis:  Cycle of Revenge Hangs over Libya’s Fragile Peace, REUTERS 
(Oct. 31, 2011, 8:08 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/31/us-libya-revenge-
idUSTRE79U1OF20111031. 
 234. Kareem Fahim & Adam Nossiter, In Libya, Massacre Site Is Cleaned Up, Not 
Investigated, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2011, at A4. 
 235. See id. 
 236. See Francois Murphy, Libya Vows It, Not ICC, Will Try Saif, Senussi, REUTERS 
(Nov. 20, 2011, 10:32 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/21/us-libya-icc-
idUSTRE7AK08K20111121. 
 237. See Golovnina, supra note 233. 
 238. See id. 
 239. See Fahim & Nossiter, supra note 234.  However, on November 8, 2011, a Tunisian 
appeals court approved the extradition of Gaddafi’s former prime minister to Libya.  Before 
entering this order, the judge expressly considered human rights concerns raised by human 
rights groups and foreign government related to treatment of Gaddafi loyalists. See Libya — 
Revolution and Aftermath, supra note 5. 
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principles.240  First, there are numerous reports that detainees from the 
revolution currently held in Libyan prisons are being tortured and subjected 
to human rights abuses.241  Also, according to Amnesty International, many 
of the over 8,000 detainees242 were arrested without a warrant and without 
any legitimate reason whatsoever, other than being thought to have 
supported Gaddafi.243  The NTC does not officially condone this conduct, 
nor does it directly control these detention centers.244  But despite their 
knowledge of these alleged abuses, Libyan authorities have been powerless 
to stop them.245
B.  The ICC’s Involvement in Libya 
 
The issues regarding Libya’s social, political, and legal stability are on 
full display as the ICC seeks to determine how to handle the trial of Saif Al-
Islam, Gaddafi’s son and former de facto prime minister.  Saif, who faces 
charges from the ICC for crimes against humanity,246 was captured by a 
local militia on November 19, 2011 and has been detained in the Libyan 
town of Zintan ever since.247  But while the President of the ICC’s 
Assembly of States Parties has publicly lauded the Libyan authorities for 
arresting Saif,248
 
 240. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 
 and for “tak[ing] a major step towards ensuring 
1, at 599 (reporting sub-standard prison 
conditions and “consistent reports of abuse, including beatings and some use of electric 
shock”). 
 241. See Libya:  Protesters Accuse Prison Officials of Mistreating Pro-Qaddafi 
Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2011, at A6. 
 242. See Liam Stack, Qaddafi Son Being Held by Rebels, Rights Group Says, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 21, 2011, at A12.  According to human rights activists who visited Libya, none of these 
8,000 prisoners have had a trial date set by the Libyan government, and none have had 
access to a lawyer. Id. 
 243. See AMNESTY INT’L, DETENTION ABUSES STAINING THE NEW LIBYA 5–8 (2011), 
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE19/036/2011/en/e1c30d0f-8ec3-
4368-8537-03f1bb15a051/mde190362011en.pdf. 
 244. See Libya:  Protesters Accuse Prison Officials of Mistreating Pro-Qaddafi 
Detainees, supra note 241. 
 245. See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 243, at 5 (describing, in particular, an example of 
prison officials purposely ignoring release orders given by judicial police and prosecution). 
But see Member States Vote to Reinstate Libya as Member of UN Human Rights Council, 
UN NEWS CENTRE (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=
40438&Cr=libya&Cr1= (“United Nations Member States voted overwhelmingly . . . to 
readmit Libya as a member of the UN Human Rights Council . . . [due to Libya’s] recent 
commitments . . . to promote and protect human rights, democracy and the rule of law . . . 
.”). 
 246. See Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11, Warrant of Arrest for Saif Al-Islam 
Gaddafi, at 6 (June 27, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1101345.pdf (charging 
him for the crime of murder within the meaning of article 7(1)(a) of the Rome Statute, and 
persecution within the meaning of article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute). 
 247. See Stack, supra note 242. 
 248. It is unclear how much control Libya’s central government had over Saif’s initial 
capture, and how much control it now has over his detention.  It appears that a local militia 
from the mountain town of Zintan is responsible for his arrest, and are the ones now 
detaining him, in cooperation with the NTC. See id. (quoting a representative from Human 
Rights Watch, who explains that “[i]t is not accurate to say [Saif] is being held by a militia 
outside of government control, although it is not true that he is in a prison directly controlled 
by the government, either”). 
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accountability”249 in their regime, it remains to be seen whether the ICC 
will actually allow Libyan domestic courts to handle Saif’s trial, as Libyan 
leaders and citizens urge,250 or whether the uncertainties surrounding the 
new government and the perceived need for swift and efficient justice 
necessitate that the ICC conduct the trial.251  As the ICC’s Chief Prosecutor 
explained to the Libyan authorities during a November 2011 visit, the 
present circumstances provide several options for bringing Saif to 
justice.252
The first option is for the Libyan judicial system to try Saif itself.
 
253  
Since Saif’s capture, and especially during the Prosecutor’s November trip 
to Libya, Libyan authorities have stated that this is their desired course of 
action, citing the significance that such a trial would have for Libyans and 
for the future of the country more generally.254  However, the Prosecutor 
and the ICC have made clear that Libya’s desire to try Saif does not 
automatically give the Libyans that privilege.255  Despite urgings from the 
Libyan authorities that they are committed to conducting a fair trial in 
accordance with international law standards,256 the ICC has repeatedly 
emphasized that the decision is not for the Libyan government to make.257
 
 249. See Press Release, Assembly of States Parties, President of the Assembly of States 
Parties Welcomes Arrest of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Nov. 19, 2011), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/exeres/2243BC6E-B58C-4A8A-9B21-D309E49AE5AC.htm. 
  
Pursuant to articles 17 and 19 of the Rome Statute, Libya must formally 
 250. See Rami Al-Shaheibi, Gaddafi’s Son Saif al-Islam Seized in Southern Libya, TIME 
(Nov. 19, 2011, 11:00 AM), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2099886,
00.html (citing Libya’s Informational Minister Mahmoud Shammam); Murphy, supra note 
236 (citing an interview with Libya’s interim justice minister Mohammed al-Alagi). 
 251. See Al-Shaheibi, supra note 250 (citing a member of Amnesty International who 
emphasized that in order for Saif to be brought to justice as quickly as possible, he must be 
handed over to the ICC). 
 252. See Prosecution’s Submissions, supra note 11, ¶¶ 7–9.  The Court has already 
decided that Saif’s case falls within its jurisdiction. See Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. 
ICC-01/11, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar 
Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, ¶ 10 
(June 27, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1101337.pdf; see also supra notes 
118–28. 
 253. See Prosecution’s Submissions, supra note 11, ¶ 7. 
 254. See id. ¶ 4; Murphy, supra note 236; Arrest of Qadhafi’s Son Vital ‘for the Future of 
Justice in Libya’ — UN Human Rights Chief, UN NEWS CENTRE (Nov. 21, 2011), 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40464&Cr=libya&Cr1=. 
 255. See Prosecution’s Submissions, supra note 11, ¶ 4; Press Release, Int’l Criminal 
Court, Course of Action Before the ICC Following the Arrest of the Suspect Saif Al Islam 
Gaddafi in Libya (Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/48F6B130-EC14-4A51-
BC79-1CCF8633E270.htm; see also Saif al-Islam Gaddafi Could Be Tried in Libya, Says 
ICC Prosecutor, GUARDIAN (Nov. 22, 2011, 10:14 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/
2011/nov/22/saif-al-islam-gaddafi-trial-libya (quoting the ICC Chief Prosecutor, who 
emphasized that Libya may prosecute Saif only if it complies with ICC standards). 
 256. See Prosecution’s Submissions, supra note 11, ¶ 5. 
 257. See id. ¶ 7; Public Redacted Version of “OPCD Observations on Libya’s 
Submissions Regarding the Arrest of Saif Al-Islam” ¶ 5, Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-
01/11 (Feb. 3, 2012) [hereinafter OPCD Observations], available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1326934.pdf (emphasizing that the ICC retains jurisdiction over the 
case until a formal admissibility challenge is made). 
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challenge the admissibility of Saif’s case to the ICC;258 only if ICC judges 
are satisfied that Libya displays an adequate commitment to justice will 
Libya be permitted to try Saif at home.259  If, however, the ICC deems the 
case admissible, or if Libya does not challenge the admissibility issue, then 
the case is in the ICC’s hands.260
Even with control over the case, the ICC Prosecutor has stated that there 
might nevertheless be opportunities for the ICC and Libya to cooperate in 
the trial process.
 
261  The first option for cooperation would be to sequence 
trials, which would allow Libya to fully investigate and try Saif for crimes 
unrelated to the ICC’s charges before handing him over to the ICC, where 
he would then be tried for the more serious crimes with which he is 
charged.262  The second option would be for the ICC to actually conduct its 
trial of Saif in Libya.263  However, neither of these options appears to 
interest Libyan authorities as much as prosecuting Saif themselves in 
domestic courts.264
IV.  RECONCILING THE SITUATION IN LIBYA WITH THE ICC’S GOALS 
AND UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES 
 
As the situation in Libya continues to develop, and decisions about how 
to bring Saif (and eventually others) to justice loom, the ICC faces a critical 
juncture that could define how it operates and its place within the 
international criminal justice community.  Recognizing the opportunity 
before the ICC, and taking into account the Court’s founding principles and 
ultimate goals, this part proposes a comprehensive solution to the problem 
of where and how to try Saif al-Islam Gaddafi. 
Part IV.A begins by outlining how the Court is likely to approach the 
question of whether Saif’s case is admissible.  Part IV.B then argues that, 
despite the attention it is receiving, the question of admissibility should not 
ultimately be the determinative one in deciding where and how to bring Saif 
to justice.  In addition to admissibility, Part IV.B.1 contends that the ICC’s 
underlying principles and goals should dictate its course of action with 
 
 258. See supra notes 161–66 and accompanying text (describing the process by which 
Libya can challenge the admissibility of the case). 
 259. See Prosecution’s Submissions, supra note 11, ¶ 7; Press Release, supra note 255. 
 260. See Prosecution’s Submissions, supra note 11, ¶¶ 7–9. 
 261. See id.; see also Saif al-Islam Gaddafi Could Be Tried in Libya, Says ICC 
Prosecutor, supra note  255 (“[Libya has] decided to [try to prosecute Saif], and that is why 
[the ICC is] here—to learn and to understand what they are doing and to co-operate.”).  
However, even though Libya has asked the ICC to “provide advice and . . . monitor [their] 
domestic proceedings,” the Prosecutor has made clear that “it is not within the mandate of 
the Office of the Prosecutor to serve as advisor or to monitor a domestic trial.” Prosecution’s 
Submissions, supra note 11, ¶¶ 6–7. 
 262. See id. ¶¶ 5, 8 (citing Rome Statute, supra note 79, art. 94).  Libyan authorities are 
currently investigating Saif for corruption that occurred prior to the February 2011 
revolution. See Stack, supra note 242. 
 263. See Prosecution’s Submissions, supra note 11, ¶ 9; Murphy, supra note 236.  The 
Rome Statute allows the Court to sit in an alternate location if it so desires. Rome Statute, 
supra note 79, art. 3(3). 
 264. Cf. Prosecution’s Submissions, supra note 11, ¶ 9. 
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respect to Saif.  And that course of action, Part IV.B.2 argues, should be to 
try Saif in Libya with the help and cooperation of the Libyan judicial 
system. 
A.  The Admissibility of Saif’s Case 
At the heart of the Court’s mandate is the requirement that every case it 
adjudicates must be admissible.265  Understanding how the ICC will and 
should proceed with respect to Saif’s case thus requires some attention to 
the question of its admissibility.  This section outlines how the Court will 
likely approach that question and highlights the salient issues the Court will 
need to consider in answering it.266
Given the circumstances surrounding Libya and this case, as well as the 
criteria under which the ICC will examine those circumstances, the Court’s 
admissibility analysis will likely be very complicated.  Pursuant to article 
17, the first issue the Court will have to address is whether Libya is 
currently investigating Saif’s case in a way that indicates that it is “[willing] 
genuinely to carry out the investigation [and eventual] prosecution.”
 
267  
Even though Libya’s investigation against Saif is experiencing some 
delay,268 it does not appear to be the kind of delay that is “inconsistent with 
an intent to bring [him] to justice”—which is what article 17 requires in 
order for the Court to come to an “unwilling” determination.269  In fact, by 
all accounts, Libyans seem intent on ensuring that Saif is brought to 
justice.270
The more interesting and controversial aspect of the Court’s admissibility 
determination will be assessed under article 17(1)(a)’s “unable” prong.  On 
one hand, there is strong evidence that Libya will be unable genuinely to 
carry out an investigation and prosecution in a way that is truly consistent 
with justice and international due process standards.  For one, Libya’s 
current legal and judicial infrastructure is limited.
 
271
 
 265. See supra note 
  Of the infrastructure 
130 and accompanying text (noting the admissibility requirement); 
supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text (describing the significance and textual origins of 
the principle of complementarity); supra notes 131–33 and accompanying text (describing 
that the admissibility regime directly implements the principle of complementarity into the 
Statute). 
 266. The Court may never actually have to issue a formal admissibility ruling. See supra 
note 162 (observing that as a general matter “the Court is not obligated to make a formal 
admissibility ruling”); note 161 and accompanying text (observing that article 18’s process 
of conducting a preliminary admissibility ruling does not apply to Security Council 
referrals); note 10 (indicating that Saif’s case began with a Security Council referral).  
However, given Libya’s strong desire to try Saif at home, see supra notes 250, 254 and 
accompanying text, it appears likely that Libyan officials will eventually challenge the case’s 
admissibility pursuant to article 19. 
 267. See supra notes 142–43 and accompanying text. 
 268. See OPCD Observations, supra note 257, ¶ 5 (indicating how little information 
regarding the investigation Libya has provided to the ICC, and that the information it has 
provided has been delayed); id. ¶ 34 (“There is no indication or evidence that the current 
domestic investigation against [Saif] had commenced at the time of his arrest.”). 
 269. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 270. See supra notes 250, 254 and accompanying text. 
 271. See supra notes 236–39 and accompanying text. 
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that is in place, reporters and human rights groups have raised grave 
concerns about its adequacy in protecting prisoners and conducting fair and 
efficient proceedings.272  Moreover, adding to these general concerns is 
information suggesting that Saif’s detention in particular has failed to 
provide some basic due process protections—namely, Saif’s captors have 
not allowed him to see a lawyer or talk to family members, and it is even 
unclear whether he is being detained pursuant to a valid arrest warrant.273
On the other hand, important members of the international community 
have praised the Libyan government for its commitment to defending 
human rights and the promise it has shown thus far to that end.
 
274  Also, 
because the bar for demonstrating “inability” is meant to be high, “as the 
ICC is not a human rights monitoring body, and its role is not to ensure 
perfect procedures and compliance with all international standards,”275 the 
ICC judges might very well be reticent to conclude that the aforementioned 
concerns rise to the level necessary to constitute “a total or substantial 
collapse or unavailability of [Libya’s] national judicial system,” or that 
those concerns demonstrate that Libya is “otherwise unable to carry out 
[Saif’s] proceedings.”276
B.  The Decision of Where and How to Try Saif Should Be Governed by the 
Court’s Founding Principles and Goals, Not by the Case’s Admissibility 
  Weighing these factors against the arguments that 
Libya will be unable to effectively and fairly bring Saif to justice, the Court 
faces a difficult decision with respect to the admissibility of Saif’s case.  
Given the ICC’s founding principles and goals, however, the Court’s course 
of action in Libya need not turn on that decision. 
While the admissibility requirement is certainly an important part of the 
principle of complementarity,277 this Comment has sought to demonstrate 
that admissibility is but one aspect of the complementarity regime.278
 
 272. See supra notes 
  As 
such, the issue of admissibility should not be the sole factor in determining 
where and how Saif will see justice.  Instead, in deciding this issue, the 
Court should look to its underlying purpose, and allow that purpose to 
shape its conceptualization of complementarity in a new, more proactive 
direction.  Part IV.B.1 explores the Court’s underlying purpose and explains 
how a proactive approach to complementarity better helps fulfill that 
purpose, and Part IV.B.2 then applies that approach to Saif’s case and 
proposes a plan for bringing him to justice. 
240–43 and accompanying text. 
 273. See OPCD Observations, supra note 257, ¶¶ 2, 15. 
 274. See supra note 245 (observing that the U.N. General Assembly recently readmitted 
Libya to its Human Rights Council). 
 275. See INFORMAL EXPERT PAPER, supra note 102, ¶ 49. 
 276. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 277. See supra notes 129–46 and accompanying text. 
 278. See supra Parts I.B.3, II.A. 
2012] LIBYA AND THE ICC 2301 
1.  The Court’s Ultimate Goals Are Most Effectively Achieved 
Through the Concept of Proactive Complementarity 
As discussed above, the ICC was founded on the notions that impunity 
for the world’s most serious crimes must end, and that violators of these 
crimes must never be allowed to escape justice.279  But when the ICC 
became part of the international criminal justice landscape almost a decade 
ago, it entered into a preexisting system of domestic courts and other types 
of international tribunals that was also designed to bring about this end.280  
The idea behind the ICC’s creation was that the Court would supplement 
those existing mechanisms and provide an avenue for justice when the 
others failed to do so.281  Reflecting that idea, the principle of 
complementarity thus guides the Court’s work.282
But to so narrowly conceptualize the Court’s ultimate goal of ending 
impunity, its guiding principle of complementarity, and the relationship 
between the two is to overlook the broader purpose that the ICC should 
serve.  The Court extends beyond prosecuting and adjudicating individual 
criminal cases for the sake of providing justice and peace instance-by-
instance.  More fundamentally, its purpose, as recognized by 
commentators,
 
283 the ICC President,284 and the Rome Statute,285 is to end 
impunity for the world’s most serious crimes altogether.286  Ideally, that 
goal is achieved by building a system of domestic courts that are so 
interconnected, efficient, and committed to achieving justice that, 
ultimately, every case is prosecuted at the domestic level and thus every 
case becomes inadmissible for the ICC.287  Essentially, the ICC’s long-term 
goal, as the ICC’s first Chief Prosecutor recognized, should be to make 
itself irrelevant.288
For the ICC to make that goal a reality, a number of requirements and 
considerations come into play—considerations that touch on transitional 
justice issues and require a broader, proactive approach to 
complementarity.
 
289
 
 279. See supra notes 
  Practically speaking, creating a global system of 
interconnected domestic courts fundamentally requires that individual 
domestic legal systems be properly equipped with the requisite competence, 
sophistication, and commitment to justice that the ICC and international 
criminal justice community demand.  And in the context of countries that 
are emerging from conflict and seeking transitional justice, that competence 
198–202 and accompanying text. 
 280. See supra Part I.A (discussing the nature of, and relationship between, international 
tribunals, hybrid tribunals, and domestic courts). 
 281. See supra notes 96–112 and accompanying text. 
 282. See supra notes 96–112 and accompanying text. 
 283. See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
 284. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
 285. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
 286. See supra notes 201–02 and accompanying text. 
 287. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 288. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 289. See supra notes 175–81 and accompanying text. 
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and commitment can only truly be developed by giving the society an 
opportunity to address its past crimes directly and to heal from them.290
In building this system over the long term, the ICC will thus be required 
to balance the objective due process standards to which the international 
community is committed with the subjective, individualized needs of 
countries in dire need of criminal justice.
 
291  The only way for the ICC to 
satisfy both requirements is for it to actively cooperate with domestic legal 
systems in investigating and prosecuting cases.292  Creating this dynamic 
within the confines of the Rome Statute requires an acknowledgment that 
the principle of complementarity does more than just tell the Court when it 
may not do something.293  Instead, the Court must be able to follow some 
of the ideas of commentators294 and experts295 and use the principle of 
complementarity proactively as a mechanism that empowers it to help 
domestic states achieve justice on their own terms.296
2.  Using the Concept of Proactive Complementarity, the Court Should 
Ensure a Fair Trial for Saif in Libya with the Help and Involvement 
of Libyan Authorities 
  Adopting such an 
interpretation of the complementarity principle would, in the short term, 
ensure that justice is attained adequately and in line with international 
standards.  In the long term, it would help build up domestic legal systems 
to the point where the ICC’s help is no longer needed. 
Due to its obligations297 and limited resources,298
Regardless of how the ICC judges ultimately rule on the question of 
admissibility, the first priority in bringing Saif to justice should be to try 
him in Libya.  The importance of trying Saif in Libya, in front of the Libyan 
people, stems from Libya’s need to face its past and exact justice from a 
 the ICC cannot and 
should not transform itself from a court of international criminal law into a 
nation-building institution.  But the ICC should make it a priority to assist 
states, in some circumstances, in bringing the world’s most serious 
criminals to justice.  This section proposes a way for the ICC and Libya to 
cooperate in light of these goals, considerations, and limitations.  This plan 
emphasizes that Saif should be tried for his crimes against humanity in 
Libya by some combination of both ICC and Libyan prosecutors and 
judges. 
 
 290. See supra notes 212–19 and accompanying text. 
 291. See supra notes 213–19 and accompanying text (referring to transitional justice 
principles). 
 292. See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
 293. See supra note 175 and accompanying text (providing a basic definition of proactive 
complementarity). 
 294. See supra notes 175–85 and accompanying text. 
 295. See supra notes 178–96 and accompanying text. 
 296. See supra notes 213–16 and accompanying text. 
 297. See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text. 
 298. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text. 
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person, and a regime, that caused the nation so much harm.299  As an 
important part of Gaddafi’s regime, Saif not only was a direct participant 
and coordinator of the February 2011 violence,300 but he is also seen, 
following Gaddafi’s death, as a symbol of that regime and of all the pain it 
inflicted on the Libyan people.301  Thus, in order for Libya to emerge from 
its most recent conflict fully healed, it is important that the Libyan people 
see and feel that justice in their country.302
If Saif’s case is inadmissible, then it will be tried in Libya, because his 
case will be entirely in the hands of the Libyan government.
 
303  If the case 
turns out to be admissible, however, the ICC should utilize article 3 of the 
Rome Statute304 and, as the Prosecutor has suggested,305 conduct the trial in 
Libya instead of The Hague.  In the event that the case is admissible, taking 
this step to nevertheless try it in Libya has the additional benefit of 
providing an example for Libya’s troubled306
In addition to trying Saif’s case in Libya, it is also incredibly important 
that members of the Libyan judicial system participate alongside ICC 
personnel, or vice versa, throughout the course of the investigation and trial.  
Such cooperation would satisfy both Libya’s need to heal and develop itself 
in the long term,
 judicial system to follow as it 
develops. 
307 as well as the international criminal justice 
community’s need to try Saif efficiently and fairly in the short term.308  In 
effect, the ICC should follow the suggestion proposed in the Office of the 
Prosecutor’s informal expert paper on complementarity, and use the trial as 
an opportunity to train Libyan prosecutors and judges in how to conduct a 
high-profile international criminal case.309
If the case is admissible, then for reasons of fairness, due process, or 
security, the ICC prosecutors and judges will need to have primary control 
over it.
 
310  In such a scenario, then, the Court should invite members of the 
Libyan judicial system to observe and participate in the trial’s various 
stages.  If, on the other hand, the case is inadmissible, and the ICC 
relinquishes complete control of the case over to Libya, the ICC should 
nevertheless assist the Libyans to the extent that they request it,311
 
 299. See supra note 
 as long 
208 and accompanying text (noting the importance, from a 
transitional justice perspective, of holding criminals from past regimes accountable). 
 300. See supra note 246 and accompanying text. 
 301. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 302. See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
 303. Cf. supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text (describing the admissibility 
requirement for the ICC to hear a case). 
 304. See supra note 263 and accompanying text. 
 305. See supra note 263 and accompanying text. 
 306. If the case is deemed to be admissible, that necessarily means that the ICC detects 
some problem with either Libya’s ability or willingness to try the case pursuant to 
international law standards. See supra notes 129–47 and accompanying text. 
 307. See supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
 308. See supra notes 251–52 and accompanying text. 
 309. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
 310. See supra notes 142–43 and accompanying text. 
 311. See supra note 261 and accompanying text. 
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as such assistance does not develop into the ICC effectively conducting the 
prosecution itself.312
Even though this kind of assistance or training would be beyond the 
Rome Statute’s express instructions,
 
313 and beyond what the Chief 
Prosecutor has said he is willing to do,314 it nevertheless makes sense for 
this kind of cooperation to take place, considering the ICC’s long-term 
interest in building up Libya’s judicial system315 and Libya’s current 
deficiencies.316  Thus, for these reasons and in these ways, the mechanism 
that prosecutes Saif, whether it is primarily the ICC or primarily a Libyan 
court, should act like a hybrid tribunal317
CONCLUSION 
 and incorporate both international 
and domestic components. 
Facing a decision on how to proceed with the situation in Libya, the ICC 
is in a very significant place in its short life.  In its decision, the Court will 
be forced to reconcile the central concepts on which it was founded—
ending impunity for the world’s most serious crimes and the principle of 
complementarity—with the complicated circumstances in Libya.  But while 
the solutions to the problems Libya poses are not readily apparent from the 
plain text of the Rome Statute, this Comment has argued that by re-
conceptualizing some of its own basic principles, the Court can reach a 
satisfying conclusion for itself, Libya, and the international criminal justice 
community. 
While the ultimate success or failure of the Court does not rest on what it 
decides to do in Libya, the Libya situation nevertheless provides an 
opportunity for the Court to demonstrate how it intends to interpret its 
fundamental goals and founding principles moving forward.  Properly 
taking advantage of that opportunity will require the Court to think 
creatively, and in a way that brings Libya and the ICC together in a 
cooperative effort toward justice. 
 
 
 
 312. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
 313. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
 314. See supra note 261 (indicating the Prosecutor’s reluctance to advise Libya and 
monitor a trial if the case is deemed inadmissible). 
 315. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 316. See supra notes 230–45 and accompanying text. 
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